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VOLUME 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Abstract  
 
The theme of this context statement is psychological formulation, which can be defined as a 
summary of a client’s difficulties, based on psychological theory, and informing the 
intervention.  
 
Within this context statement, I will demonstrate how I have contributed to the development of 
psychological formulation theoretically and clinically in the following areas: 
 
• Co-editing the first book on psychological formulation to take a critical and reflective 
overview of formulation in different therapeutic traditions (Public Works 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). 
• Developing an innovative model for teaching formulation to clinical psychology trainees 
(PW 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.) 
• Developing and delivering workshops on integrative formulation, locally, nationally and 
for the Division of Clinical Psychology (PW 4.2.3). 
• Developing the practice of team formulation in my own clinical work, in both inpatient 
and outpatient settings (PW 4.3.1.) 
• Developing workshops and training in team formulation for teams and wards (PW 
4.3.2.) 
• Supervising research into formulation (PW 4.3.3.) 
• Generally promoting the use of formulation for culture change among clinical 
psychologists, mental health professionals and service user groups by my writing and public 
speaking (PW 4.4.1,  4.4.2.). 
 
Volume 1 Part 1 contains a summary of the Public Works, a timeline, and an introduction to the 
concept of formulation, with examples. 
 
Volume 1 Part 2 outlines the personal and professional background to my interest in 
formulation, with reference to key publications, achievements, influences and challenges during 
my career. 
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Volume 1 Part 3 describes the Public Works, the knowledge and skills which underpin them, 
how I have applied them in the field of Adult Mental Health, and the impact they have had on 
theory and clinical practice. I will draw on four main areas of Public Works in more or less 
chronological sequence. The majority were produced over the time period 2006-2010, although 
some of the clinical work at Southmead Hospital, Bristol (2004-2006) precedes this, as does 
some of the work on the Formulation Theme of the Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate (2001 
- 2010.) I will conclude with a critical reflection on the whole area of formulation and some 
plans for developing the work further. 
 
Volume 1 Part 4 contains examples of the Public Works. 
 
Throughout the context statement, I will demonstrate and provide evidence for advanced 
conceptual understanding, professional knowledge and collaboration, and critical evaluation of 
this leading edge area of clinical practice. Vol 1 parts 2 and 3 have been revised and extended to 
take account of feedback from the Registration Panel. 
 
Supplementary information will be submitted in boxfiles, as follows: 
 
Volume 2 boxfiles (unbound) will contain further examples of Public Works and evidence of 
impact.  
 
Volume 3 boxfiles (unbound) will contain examples of general background work and additional 
evidence of impact. 
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1.2 Timeline 
 
Timeline leading up to the Public Works    1956- 2010 
            
PROFESSIONALCONTEXT: 
ACADEMIC 
 
1960 – 1967  Welland House 
Junior School,  Stamford, Lincs 
 
1967 – 1973 Stamford High 
School for Girls 
 
1975 – 1978  MA Hons in 
Psychology and Philosophy 
(P.P.P.) Class 2:1. St Hilda's 
College, Oxford  
 
1                                   1979-1980 Postgraduate 
Certificate of Education, 
Brighton Polytechnic  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1992 – 2000 Senior Lecturer in 
Clinical Psychology and 
Counselling, University of the 
West of England, Bristol  
 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL 
CONTEXT: CLINICAL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980-1983 Diploma in Clinical 
Psychology, NW Thames RHA 
Training Scheme 
 
1983 – 1985 Basic Grade 
Psychologist at Faringdon Wing 
Unit, Luton and Dunstable 
General Hospital  
 
1985 – 1988 Senior Clinical 
Psychologist based at Barrow 
Hospital, Bristol  
 
1986-1990 Professional Adviser 
to National MIND 
 
1988 – 1992 Principal 
Psychologist based at Ham 
Green Psychiatric Unit, Bristol 
  
1992-1995Committee member, 
Psychotherapy Section of the 
BPS. Organiser and speaker at 
1995 conference ‘Meanings and 
madness: Psychotherapy and 
Psychosis, Bristol. 
 
1993-1996 Professional Adviser 
to South West MIND 
 
KEY PUBLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1989 Users and abusers of 
psychiatry: a critical look at 
traditional psychiatric practice, 
Routledge 
 
1993b Family management in 
‘schizophrenia’: its assumptions 
and contradictions. Journal of 
Mental Health, 14, 255-261 
 
1993a Psychiatry: are we 
allowed to disagree? Clinical 
Psychology Forum, 56, 19-22 
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1993 Invited contributor to Dept 
of Health Scoping study on 
review of the 1993 Mental 
Health Act, in relation to ECT 
 
1995  Granted Statement of 
Equivalence as a Chartered 
Counselling Psychologist    
 
 
 
 
 
2000 Contributor to BPS report 
‘Recent advances in 
understanding mental illness and 
psychotic experiences’ 
 
 
2001- 2008 Academic Tutor, 
then Director, on Bristol Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
 
2002 Member of reference group 
for Dept of Health/SURE review 
of user literature on ECT, 
Institute of Psychiatry 
 
2003 BPS representative for 
submission of evidence to the 
NICE technology appraisal on 
the use of ECT 
 
2004 Author of BPS position 
statement on ECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996-1997 Committee Member 
of ISPS (International Society 
for the Psychological Treatment 
of the Schizophrenias and other 
Psychoses) Co-organiser of and 
speaker at IPSP International 
Conference 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001- 2004 One day a week in 
CMHT at Grove Road Day 
Centre, Bristol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 Self-injury and the 
psychiatric response. Feminism 
and Psychology, 7, 3, 421-426 
 
1999a Adverse psychological 
effects of ECT. Journal of 
Mental Health, 8, 1, 69-85 
1999b Do families cause 
‘schizophrenia’? in C Dunn, C 
Newnes and G Holmes (eds) 
This is madness: a critical look 
at psychiatry and the future of 
mental health services. Ross-on-
Wye: PCCS Books 
 
2000 2nd edition of Users and 
abusers of psychiatry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003 A shocking treatment? The 
Psychologist, 16 (5), 236-239. 
 
 
 
 
2007 ‘Can trauma cause 
“psychosis”?’ Revisiting 
(another) taboo subject. Journal 
of Critical Psychology, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy, 
7 (4), 211-220. 
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The Public Works  2006- 2010 
ACADEMIC AND 
TEACHING 
CLINICAL AND TRAINING KEY PUBLICATIONS 
             
2001-2008 Academic tutor, then 
Academic Director, on Bristol 
Clinical Psychology Doctorate 
2001- 2010 Development and 
delivery of Formulation Theme 
on the Doctorate 
17.10.06 Critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Hertfordshire 
Clinical Psychology Doctorate 
20.10.06 Formulation: the role 
of the psychologist. Shropshire 
and Staffordshire Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
7. 11.06  ‘Teaching formulation’ 
(with Rudi Dallos): Group of 
Trainers in Clinical Psychology 
conference, Cardiff 
4.12.06 ‘Formulation: a potential  
the way forward together?’ in 
symposium on ‘Working 
together in the critical mental 
health field’, DCP conference, 
London. 
21.1.07 Critique of psychiatric  
diagnosis. Cardiff Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
24.05.07 ‘Using formulation in 
teams’. Psychosis Faculty of the 
BPS, BPS offices, London. 
8.02.07‘Diagnosis or 
formulation?’ at ‘Beyond 
Diagnosis’ conference, AWP 
Trust, Keynsham, Bristol 
24.05.07 ‘Using formulation in 
teams.’ Psychosis Faculty of the 
DCP conference 
11.09.2007 ‘Beyond diagnosis’ 
CASL inaugural conference, 
Liverpool. 
17.09.07 Critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Plymouth Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
24.10.2007 Opening speaker at 
‘Beyond Diagnosis’, Weston 
super Mare. 
 
(31.05.02 and 26.07.02 With 
Rudi Dallos and Willem Kuyken, 
Formulation Workshop, held at 
Exeter University May and 
University of the West of 
England.) 
 
2004-2006 One day a week at in 
CMHT at Southmead Hospital, 
Bristol. Implementing team 
formulation meetings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25.05.07 ‘Integrated formulation: 
how to do it and how to use it.’ 
DCP workshop, BPS offices, 
London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.10.07 ‘Using formulation in 
supervision.’ Cardiff Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate workshop 
 
29.2.08 ‘Integrated formulation: 
how to do it and how to use it.’ 
Trent Clinical Psychology dept, 
Mansfield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006b L Johnstone and R Dallos 
(eds) Formulation in psychology 
and psychotherapy: making 
sense of people’s problems. 
Routledge. 
Includes: Johnstone, L and 
Dallos, R Introduction to 
formulation; Dallos, R,  
Stedmon, J Wright, J and 
Johnstone, L Integrative 
formulations; Johnstone, L 
Controversies and debates in 
formulation 
 
2006a ‘The limits of biomedical 
models of mental distress.’ In 
Critical psychiatry, ed D 
Double, Palgrave. 
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ACADEMIC AND 
TEACHING 
CLINICAL AND TRAINING KEY PUBLICATIONS 
18.01.08 Critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Cardiff Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
16.5.08‘Formulation as an 
alternative to diagnosis.’ Leeds 
MIND conference 
10.9.08‘Formulation as a radical 
alternative to diagnosis.’ Asylum 
conference, Manchester 
2008-2010 Programme Director 
on Bristol Clinical Psychology 
Doctorate 
 
 
 
 
 
14.05.09 Psychiatric diagnosis: a 
critique. Seminar at Dept of 
Social Medicine, Bristol 
University 
15.07.09 Keynote speaker: 
‘Challenges to psychiatric 
diagnosis: what can formulation 
offer?’ Women in Psychology 
Annual Conference, Windsor 
 
 
20.10.09 Critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Hertfordshire Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
6.11.09 Critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Plymouth Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
12.11.09 Critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Cardiff Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate 
18.11.09 Using formulation in 
teamwork: the F factor. Invited 
talk to Specialist Registrars’ 
Jamboree, Bristol 
8.03.10 ‘Research into 
formulation: what we know and 
what we don’t.’ Bristol Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate annual 
research conference 
 
 
12.06.08 ‘Integrated formulation: 
how to do it and how to use it.’ 
DCP workshop, BPS offices, 
London 
19.06.08  ‘Integrated 
formulation: how to do it and 
how to use it.’ Coventry and 
Warwick Psychology Dept, 
Stratford on Avon. 
 
01.12.08 ‘Integrated formulation: 
how to do it and how to use it.’ 
Leicester Clinical Psychology 
Dept, Leicester 
24.04.09  Using formulation in 
supervision. Bristol Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate CPD for 
supervisors 
18.09.09 An introduction to 
integrative formulation. MSc in 
Applied Psychology Supervision 
Uni of Surrey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20.01.10 Using formulation in 
teamwork: part 1. Bristol Inner 
City Assessment and Intervention 
team 
 
 
13.05.10 Using formulation in 
teamwork: Bristol Inner City 
Support and Recovery team. 
9.06.10 Using formulation in 
teamwork: part 2. Bristol Inner 
City Assessment and Intervention 
team. 
 
 
 
 
2008b  ‘Psychiatric diagnosis.’ 
In (eds) R Tummey and T 
Turner, Critical issues in mental 
health. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Johnstone, L (2010) Challenges 
to psychiatric diagnosis: What 
does formulation have to offer 
feminist psychologists? 
Psychology of Women Section 
Review, 12, 1. 
Johnstone, L (in press) People 
with problems, not patients with 
illnesses. In (eds) M Romme and 
S Escher Making sense of 
psychosis, ISPS series: Gaskell  
 
Johnstone, L Diagnosis and 
formulation (in press) In (eds) J 
Cromby, D Harper and P Reavey 
Understanding mental health 
and distress: Beyond abnormal 
psychology Palgrave Macmillan 
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ACADEMIC AND 
TEACHING 
CLINICAL AND TRAINING KEY PUBLICATIONS 
4.10.10 ‘Borderline personality 
disorder: diagnosis or 
formulation? Keynote speech at 
‘Self harm and borderline 
personality disorder’ conference, 
ORT conference centre, London. 
 
8.09.10 Using formulation in 
teamwork: part 3. Bristol Inner 
City Assessment and Intervention 
team 
9.9.2010 Integrated 
formulation and using 
formulation in teams.  CPD 
formulation course, Leicester 
University 
14.09.10 Using formulation in 
teams. CPD day for clinical 
psychologists, Bristol 
15.09.10 Using formulation in 
teamwork. Speedwell Support 
and Recovery team, Bristol. 
5.10.10 Using formulation in 
teams. Glos Assertive Outreach 
CPD day 
8. 10.10 Using formulation in 
teams:  Art Therapists CPD day, 
Bath 
2009 –2010 One day a week on 
inpatient ward at Callington Road 
Hospital, Bristol. Promoting 
formulation, including teaching, 
and drawing up collaborative 
formulations , and establishing a 
formulation team on the ward. 
 
 
Cole, S and Johnstone, L (in 
press) Formulation in 
psychology and psychotherapy:  
a review of its current status and 
future research directions. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice 
Cole, S and Johnstone, L (in 
press) How clinical 
psychologists understand 
formulation as both a process 
and an event: An interpretative 
phenomenological analysis. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice 
Christofides, S,  Johnstone, L 
and Musa. M  (in press) 
‘Chipping in’: Clinical 
psychologists’ descriptions of 
their use of formulation in multi-
disciplinary team working. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, research and practice. 
Hood, N and Johnstone, L (2010) 
The hidden solution. MDT 
members’ experience of the use 
of formulation in teams. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, research and practice. 
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1.3 What is a formulation? 
 
A formulation can be described as a summary of a client’s difficulties, based on psychological 
theory, and informing the intervention. Historically, formulation grew out of behaviour therapy 
in the 1950s. In an earlier form of ‘functional analysis’, it described problem behaviour in terms 
of environmental stimuli and response contingencies and was promoted by psychologists as a 
more useful guide to treatment than psychiatric diagnosis. Formulation played a crucial role in 
the development of clinical psychology from 1969 onwards, when the term first appeared in the 
professional regulations. To this day, it is a core training competency as mandated by the 
Division of Clinical Psychology  (DCP, 2001.) Formulation is a key concept in most mainstream 
therapeutic approaches, including CBT, psychodynamic, systemic (where it is sometimes called 
the ‘working hypothesis’) and Cognitive Analytic Therapy. As such, it is part of the practice of 
other professionals as well as clinical psychologists. Psychiatrists also describe themselves as 
using formulation, although, as I will show, they tend to use the term in a rather different way. 
The context statement is based on formulation in its psychological, not psychiatric, sense. 
Despite its long history, remarkably little has been written about formulation until very recently. 
Except where otherwise indicated, therefore, the context statement describes my own original 
theoretical and clinical development of the concept, in conjunction and collaboration with 
colleagues. 
 
In 2006, I and Rudi Dallos published the first critical overview of formulation from different 
theoretical perspectives (‘Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy’ 2006b, see PW 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2.) In the first chapter I drew up this list of the core features of formulations from all 
therapeutic traditions: 
 
• Summarises the client’s core problems 
• Shows how the client’s difficulties may relate to one another, by drawing on psychological 
theories and principles 
• Suggests, on the basis of psychological theory, why the client has developed these 
difficulties, at this time and in these situations 
• Gives rise to a plan of intervention which is based in the psychological processes and 
principles already identified 
• Is open to revision and re-formulation       (Johnstone and Dallos, 2006c, p.11) 
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In brief, a formulation is a hypothesis about a person’s difficulties, which draws from 
psychological theory.  It is thus a way of integrating theory and practice. In other works, it is 
‘the lynch pin that holds theory and practice together’ (Butler, 1998, p.1), and a ‘best guess’ 
about what is going on for the client.  
 
The main purpose of a formulation is to identify the most helpful interventions, but it can also 
serve to provide an overall map or picture, enhance the therapeutic alliance, predict difficulties 
in therapy, identify missing information, promote collaboration, help to think about ‘stuckness’ 
or lack of progress, counter messages about ‘illness’ and lack of agency, frame medical 
interventions, and emphasise strengths. There are additional benefits when it is used in 
teamwork, as will be discussed.   
 
My clinical practice leads me to believe that all formulations should have the following 
characteristics: 
 
• Constructed collaboratively 
• Expressed tentatively (as a ‘best guess’) 
• Shared with the client in manageable steps 
• Written in ordinary language (avoiding professional jargon) 
• Respectful of the client’s view of what is accurate/helpful 
• Reflexive about the therapist’s own views and assumptions  
• Emphasising strengths as well as difficulties 
• Culturally sensitive 
• Open to revision and re-formulation 
 
A favourite quote of mine which describes the core assumption underpinning formulation is: 
‘…..at some level it all makes sense’ (Butler, 1998, p.2.) It seems to me that this conviction is 
absolutely central to our role as clinical psychologists and therapists. We have to start from the 
belief that no matter how unusual, eccentric, frightening, confusing, chaotic, challenging or 
upsetting someone’s behaviour or experience, there is a way of making sense of it. This includes 
the presentations that come under the heading of ‘psychosis.’ The framework for co-
constructing this sense is the formulation. 
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Another definition of formulation captures this well; it is ‘a process of ongoing collaborative 
sense-making’ (Harper and Moss, 2003, p. 8.) Or, in other words, it is ‘a way of summarising 
meanings, and of negotiating for shared ways of understanding and communicating about them’ 
(Butler, 1998, p.20.) 
 
Formulation can also be an intervention in itself. Sometimes the act of clarifying someone’s 
difficulties, and in the process helping them to feel listened to, understood and accepted, is 
enough to allow them to move forward again. Equally, constructing a team formulation of a 
complex client can itself be enough to facilitate change by enabling the staff to share and 
process their emotions, put their feelings and views about a service user in a theoretical context, 
and view a service user with new insight, compassion and hope. Team formulation is a rapidly-
developing area of particular interest to me, and with great potential for changing cultures in 
mental health and other health care settings. 
 
Although formulation is most often used by clinical psychologists, I have found that this simple 
and yet sophisticated framework for generating shared psychosocial understandings of people’s 
difficulties is enormously valued by other mental health professionals once they have 
experienced how it can work in practice. My own background is in adult mental health, and it is 
within these settings and related teaching and training that I have developed and implemented 
the various strands of my work on formulation 
 
1.4 Examples of formulations 
 
To give a flavour of the use of formulation in Adult Mental Health settings, anonymised 
examples of two formulations appear below. Further examples of individual formulations 
developed with service users can be found in Vol 2. 
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1.4.1 Sarah 
 
This formulation was drawn up collaboratively with a service user whom I will call Sarah, as 
part of my work on an inpatient ward. She has given me permission to use it. The ‘team’ version 
can be found in Vol 2 (unbound.)  
 
Sarah was in her mid-forties, and had a 25 year psychiatric history of ‘bipolar disorder.’ I met 
her during a very turbulent 15 month period of inpatient treatment, which included numerous 
incidences of sectioning, forced medication, transfer to a secure ward, and so on. Sarah had 
become deeply entangled in the mental patient role, which she both clung to and hated. In the 
process, she had alienated a series of ward teams, and came to me with a reputation of being a 
‘nightmare patient.’ This is the formulation we had reached by the end of my contact with her, 
quoted with her permission.  
 
It sounds as if you spent much of your early life longing for love, acceptance and approval from 
your parents and others. You particularly wanted to perform well academically to please your 
father. You did not always agree with your parents’ values and lifestyle, but were perhaps not 
very sure about how you yourself wanted to live your life. 
 
You had few friends at school, and felt that you did not fit in there either. You lacked 
confidence in your appearance but did well academically, and it was therefore a major blow to 
your self-confidence when you did not achieve your expected exam results.  
 
Your craving for love and closeness meant that you looked for fulfilment in the form of a 
romance, and quickly developed strong feelings for boyfriends and partners, along with a wish 
to please, and fear of abandonment. The intense need for acceptance meant that you did not 
always choose partners who were right for you, and sometimes you were exploited by men. You 
also had some disturbing experiences with some men that you befriended, and this seems to 
have triggered your first breakdown at age 19. Receiving a psychiatric diagnosis and going into 
hospital was yet another serious blow to your self-image and confidence. While unwell, you had 
fantasies about unobtainable men, and about being famous and wealthy. This can perhaps be 
understood as a wish to compensate for your feelings of failure. 
 
Your lengthy recent admission was partly the result of the very difficult decision to leave your 
second marriage. You feel that you had reached a crisis in your life, which boiled up in the form 
of extreme behaviour and ‘high’ moods. In your words, these moods were made up of a mixture 
of anger, defiance and despair. In retrospect, it seems as if you needed to go through this very 
difficult stage in order to find out who you were and how you wanted to live your life. You were 
full of fury, which was often expressed on the ward and in outbursts in the community. Some of 
this anger was fuelled by the belief that people were purposely frustrating you, or deliberately 
setting you tests. You found it difficult to reach a mid-ground between being a ‘doormat’, as you 
feel you have been all your life, and regaining a sense of power and control by being aggressive. 
Unfortunately, this often led to you being treated more restrictively, which gave you even more 
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reasons to feel trapped and angry. You hated being a ‘mental patient’ with all the stigma that 
this implied, but at the same time it seemed to the staff that you were quite scared about moving 
out of hospital and re-building your life. There was a period when you moved back and forward 
between the ward and the community, not quite able to leave the hospital behind, which was 
frustrating for everyone involved.   
 
After we discussed and agreed the need for you to take back responsibility, you reached the 
point where you were ready to make the transition out of hospital, away from the ‘mental 
patient’ role, and into the start of your new life. You have marked this by changing your name. 
You are not on any medication and are having only limited contact with mental health services. 
This is a huge achievement. 
 
You have done an enormous amount of reflecting over the last year, and feel rightly proud of 
yourself for being able to make your own decisions about your relationships and lifestyle. In 
doing this you have drawn on your many strengths – intelligence, perceptiveness, determination, 
creativity and so on. You acknowledge that you have a past history of mental health problems, 
but this is no longer a source of shame.  
 
You know that there are certain risks ahead – for example, placing too many expectations on 
new relationships, feeling unable to settle for an ‘ordinary’ life rather than a fantasy one, 
allowing yourself to be provoked and lose your temper, and so on. It is a mark of the progress 
you have made that you are very aware of these, and are taking things slowly and realistically.  
 
Comment and outcome: This was one of the rare cases in which, after a fairly long period of 
work with the ward and with Sarah, I managed to persuade the team to ‘de-medicalise’ her, 
rescind her section, accept that she would discontinue her medication, and treat her as 
responsible for her actions. This felt risky, but the effect was dramatic: Sarah left hospital, 
bought her own flat, started a healthy new relationship, and expressed enormous gratitude for 
being allowed to leave the patient role behind. She had a brief relapse and re-admission after 4 
months, but together she and the team were able to identify triggers and draw up a joint plan to 
avoid them in the future.  
 
Unfortunately, after a few setbacks on her home leave, Sarah lapsed back into her raging, angry 
self. She was admitted to a secure ward, where the team had strongly disagreed with our non-
medical approach; they immediately re-instated large doses of compulsory medication for her 
‘bipolar disorder’. This illustrates a very typical split in treatment approaches between different 
parts of the service, in this case the ward and the secure unit. Currently there is a risk that the re-
introduction of a narrow medical model intervention will once again set up the vicious circle of 
rebellion and fury from Sarah, which is seen as evidence of worsening ‘illness’ by the staff, 
which leads to more medication and restriction, and so on. My contract with the Trust ended at 
that point, but at our last meeting Sarah was still determined to resume her new life. She also 
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expressed enormous appreciation of the collaborative work we had done together and the hope it 
had given her. 
 
Reflection on the formulation 
I deliberately chose not to formulate one aspect of Sarah’s presentation, the confused sexualised 
references that she made about her father and brother when she was ‘high’ in mood. Although 
aware of the possibility of sexual abuse, I felt that the aim of getting her out of hospital and into 
a safer place should take priority over unpacking potentially traumatic material. It would have 
been important to pursue this issue had I continued to work with her. 
 
1.4.2 Mary 
 
The second example illustrates a typical team formulation, developed at the request of a 
Community Mental Health Team in a series of meetings which I facilitated. The formulation 
was not shared in this form with the service user, and names and identifying details have been 
changed.  
 
Mary’s background:  
 
• Aged 75 
• Father died when she was 5 
• Sent to live with cold, strict grandmother age 8 
• Unhappy marriage 
• 3 children, now adults and all refusing contact with her 
• Worked in catering until 1995 
• 45 year psychiatric history, with diagnoses of depression, bipolar disorder, personality     
disorder, anxiety. First breakdown after birth of eldest child (‘post-natal depression’) 
• Low moods roughly twice a year ever since 
• Many admissions plus different medications, 6 courses of ECT, day care, community    care, 
numerous groups and activities, etc.  
 
Current problem: 
• Experienced by staff as extremely difficult, controlling, demanding, complaining, insulting. 
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• Although she describes everything as useless, she still demands services, medication etc. 
• Suicidal gestures. 
• Professionals left with a sense of anger, stuckness, frustration and failure. 
• Residential care staff cannot cope any more and have given her notice to leave, which may 
mean she ends up back on a psychiatric ward. 
 
Tentative formulation drawn up with the team: 
 
Mary suffered a major rejection when she was sent to live with her strict grandmother, and has 
been searching for care for herself ever since. She did not have the emotional resources to cope 
with her own children, hence the post natal depression, and indeed has spent much of her life 
trying to get them to look after her. Small events that are perceived as rejections (eg her 
daughters going on holiday) trigger her ‘depression’, which is perhaps better understood as a 
deep fear of being alone and abandoned. 
 
Mary’s early rejection left her not only needy but very angry. The only way she knows how to 
get care is by inducing guilt and making angry or threatening demands. This, of course, tends to 
alienate others, who then confirm her worst fears by rejecting her, which feeds further into her 
anger and neediness. 
 
In relation to the psychiatric services, Mary has (probably not consciously or deliberately) found 
a solution to this situation by gaining care through her ‘symptoms’. At some level she does not 
want to benefit from interventions since this would result in care being withdrawn – so she 
carries on demanding services even while declaring they are useless. Her identity as a patient 
enables her not to take (or be given) responsibility for her actions. The same pattern of 
neediness/demand/anger is now being played out in relation to the residential home. 
 
     Intervention: 
 
• Share formulation with all staff, including new residential home 
• Predict challenging behaviour until Mary feels accepted 
• Draw up agreed boundaries of acceptable behaviour with Mary and staff 
• Promote security and reward good behaviour by attention, time etc 
• Anticipate rejection triggers 
• Give regular support to staff 
• Find valued non-patient roles for Mary 
• Liaise with Mary’s children 
• Rationalise medication 
• Review and re-formulate as necessary 
 19 
Comment and outcome: This is a good example of how formulation can be useful even 45 years 
into someone’s psychiatric career,. The staff at the new residential home needed a lot of support, 
but were able to tolerate Mary’s initially very difficult behaviour by understanding it within the 
‘rejection’ hypothesis. After a few months there was a sudden and dramatic change – 
presumably because Mary finally trusted that she had been accepted. She was able to show her 
lively and humorous side, and she became a genuinely accepted member of the home. Her 
children resumed contact with her, and at last update, she had not needed re-admission to 
hospital.  
 
Reflection on the formulation 
On reflection, the formulation may have fallen into the trap of seeing Mary primarily as a 
‘problem person’, rather as the staff did, and thus underplaying her strengths. The inclusion of a 
social context – eg the very limited opportunities for a woman of her generation whose marriage 
had ended – would have minimised any implications of ‘blame’. 
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VOLUME 1 PART 2 
 
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE THEME OF 
FORMULATION 
 
2.1 Overview of Part 2  
 
In Volume 1 Part 2 of the context statement I will describe the personal and professional 
background to my interest in formulation, and my reflections arising out of the writing of this 
statement. It will be seen that my personal experiences both led to an interest in mental health 
(the ‘wounded healer’ syndrome, Rippere and Williams 1985), and to a profound scepticism 
about orthodox biomedical models of mental distress, which was fully borne out in my 
experience of clinical practice. My zeal for challenging and changing psychiatric practice led me 
to develop critiques in a number of areas including psychiatric diagnosis, the biomedical model, 
family work in psychosis, self-harm, the use of ECT and medication, the role of trauma and 
abuse in psychiatric presentations, and others. Through this work I came to realise that the 
artificial categorisation of human distress into ‘diagnoses’ is fundamental to every other 
damaging aspect of psychiatry. Without a reliable and valid categorisation system, psychiatry 
becomes ‘something very hard to justify or defend – a medical specialty that does not treat 
medical illnesses’ (Breggin,1993, p. 505.) With the illusion of such a system, psychiatry 
continues to turn ‘people with problems’ into ‘patients with illnesses,’ and in the process re-
traumatises and re-abuses them. These critiques underpin and set the scene for my promotion of 
formulation over the last 4-5 years. 
 
2.2 A note on reflexivity 
 
During discussion and feedback at my Registration Panel, I was invited, among other 
suggestions, to be more explicit about the personal motivations and experiences underpinning 
my interest in formulation and in mental health work in general.  
 
As a former Clinical Psychology Course Director, the requirement to be reflective is familiar to 
me. Section 2.9 in this volume describes how the Bristol Doctorate developed its own unique 
interpretation of the Reflective Rractitioner role. This context statement has some parallels with 
the trainees’ final year Reflective Practice essay, in which they reviewed their personal and 
professional journey through the course. Criteria included ‘Demonstrates awareness of own 
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beliefs, values, background and cultural context and its impact on practice’; ‘Evidence of 
personal development over the last 3 years’ and ‘Ability to reflect on and learn from 
experience’. In other words, we asked trainees to be both reflexive and reflective. However, the 
boundaries of this were made very clear; for example, trainees were explicitly advised that it 
was not necessary to disclose personal details in order to demonstrate these competencies.  
 
My understanding of the terms reflexive and reflective is as follows:  
 
The term ‘reflexivity’ is most commonly applied to qualitative research, where it can be defined 
as ‘…..reflecting upon the ways in which our own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, 
political commitments, wider aims in life and social identities have shaped the research. It also 
involves thinking about how the research may have affected and possibly changed us, as people 
and as researchers’ (Willig, 2001, p.10.)  
 
The concept of Reflective Practice was originally developed by Schon (1983) and is now widely 
applied in the fields of health and education. Reflective practice is a notoriously slippery 
concept, but can be summarised as ‘the capacity to reflect on action so as to engage in a process 
of continuous learning’ (Schon, 1983.) ‘Reflection in action’ refers to this process as it occurs 
during a particular experience or intervention; ‘reflection on action’ happens afterwards, as the 
practitioner engages in a critical review of the event(s) in the light of theory and values.   
 
With this in mind, I have revisited the doctoral criteria. Neither reflexivity nor reflectiveness are 
mentioned in the doctoral standards listed on p. 33 of the Trainee Handbook.  However, the 
section relating to the context statement says that candidates ‘are…likely to need to take account 
of more personal factors, such as: motivation; what the major challenges have been in their 
work; what are the major influences upon the thinking of the candidate; main achievements over 
the course of their career; what skills and knowledge they have developed; how they have 
arrived at their current level of authority, influence, ability to be a change agent’ (p.34.) The 
Doctoral Descriptors include ‘Self-appraisal and reflection on practice: …..Habitually reflects 
on own and others’ practice so the self-appraisal and reflexive enquiry become intertwined, 
thereby facilitating positive changes’ (p 28.) The phrase ‘reflection on practice’ in the 
Descriptors echoes Schon’s ‘reflection on action.’ This seems to indicate that candidates are 
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expected to be both reflexive and reflective about the production of their Public Works, although 
no precise definition of these terms is given in the handbook.  
 
As we told the Bristol trainees, neither of these activities should be confused with has been 
termed by one qualititative researcher ‘agonising confessional work’ (Parker, 1999, p.31.) On 
reflection after the Registration Panel, it seems to me that there is a greater risk of blurring these 
boundaries when the qualification is in psychotherapy; hence this attempt at clarifying my 
understanding of the requirements and how I will meet them.  
 
The principal subject and content of the context statement is, of course, psychological 
formulation and the Public Works that I have developed in this field. The revised context 
statement contextualises the Public Works within the various influences on my thinking and 
practice and the challenges I have faced in mental health services. It will also include reflexive 
awareness of the ways in which aspects of my social identity (white, female, middle class, well-
educated, from a high-achieving family, and with some personal experience of mental distress) 
and the values and beliefs deriving from this background, have influenced my work.  Towards 
the end, I will reflect on the personal development that has brought me to my current position, 
and the degree to which I have succeeded in my personal mission to bring about change in the 
psychiatric system. In this way, I hope to demonstrate both reflexivity and reflectiveness. 
 
 2.3 Family background 
 
I am the eldest child from an educated middle-class family. For complex reasons I was often 
unhappy during my childhood, adolescence and young adulthood. I was born in Dorset and 
brought up from the age of 4 in a small town in Lincolnshire; my parents were both 
schoolteachers. I found family relationships difficult at times and hated my rigid and rule-bound 
girls’ grammar school. I was, however, close to my mother’s parents, and particularly my 
grandfather, a very gifted Canon in the Church of England whose principled stance won him 
admirers and detractors in equal measure. 
 
My identity as ‘the clever one’ of the siblings encouraged me to be a high achiever, but at the 
same time I was often socially isolated and confused. My main coping strategy was to hide away 
in my room and read, and from an early age I reacted not by outward rebellion, but by trying to 
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make sense of my feelings through books on psychology and psychotherapy. Thus my interest 
in mental health, psychotherapy and psychiatry dates back to my childhood. 
 
When I eventually took up a place at Oxford University, the much longed-for escape turned out 
to be another trap. The hothouse atmosphere created by the presence of 10,000 other students 
who, like me, tended towards intellectual precocity coupled with emotional immaturity, was the 
opposite of what I needed. My subjects, philosophy and psychology, were taught in a way that 
in my arrogance I believed (and still believe) to be intellectually and morally barren. I could no 
more accept experimental psychology’s perspective on human beings than I could go along with 
logical positivism as a philosophy of life. Then as now, I believe that human experience 
demands a more sophisticated explanation than one that was designed for pigeons in a cage (the 
positivist paradigm that ‘has sought to apply to human problems a theory which barely fits the 
albino rat’; Ingleby, 1981, p. 39.) Equally, I have always believed that life has an intrinsic 
meaning above and beyond the purposes we bring to it, and to say that only empirically-
verifiable statements are meaningful is more than mistaken; it is morally repugnant. I am well 
aware that I cannot ‘prove’ my views in terms that would satisfy a sceptic, but I completely 
reject the epistemological hierarchy that positions personal experiential knowledge as somehow 
inferior. Meanwhile at a personal level, my unresolved feelings and conflicts caught up with me 
in a way that took several years to resolve. While I have never been a service user myself, or 
claimed that identity, my own experience has given me an inside view of mental distress.  
 
My need to understand emotional distress pointed me towards a career in clinical psychology. 
My reading (see below) had convinced me that the area of most need, and most intellectual and 
emotional challenge, was at the sharp end of psychiatry with people labelled as ‘psychotic.’  
Clinical psychology (as opposed to counselling or psychotherapy) was a route into this world.   
 
Unlike the trainees whom I subsequently taught on the Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate 
(see p.22), the critique of mainstream biomedical ideas about mental distress was never a 
revelation or a shock to me; it was my core assumption and starting point, based on my personal 
experiences and my immersion in books on psychotherapy and psychiatry since my early teens. 
Thus the hallmark of my career, my rejection of the biomedical model of mental distress which 
sees breakdown in terms of ‘illnesses’ whose primary causes will one day be located in faulty 
biochemistry or genetics, is deeply rooted in my own life experiences and the lessons I have 
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drawn from them. Exploring the tension between these two opposing perspectives, psychiatric 
and psychosocial, has characterised my whole career. Similarly, my alternation between 
academic and clinical posts is partly explained by the need to balance surviving within, versus 
seeking to change, traditional psychiatric practice. In the first 10 years of my career, I attempted 
the difficult task of challenging psychiatric practice from the inside. In the next 9 years in higher 
education, I took a step back from direct clinical work and critiqued psychiatric theory and 
practice in my teaching, writing, public speaking and research. In the 9 years up to 2010, I found 
the ideal compromise: teaching on a clinical psychology training course alongside part-time 
clinical work. 
 
2.4 Clinical psychology training 
 
When I took up my training place, my main intellectual influences had been Jung, whose work 
had a particular resonance due to his belief in the symbolic meaning of madness and his 
spirituality; Laing (eg Laing, 1960), whose books I had found too disturbing to read as an 
undergraduate, but whose ideas I became able to assimilate as I found my feet; Jan Foudraine, 
the ‘Dutch RD Laing’, and his powerful account of revolutionising a psychiatric ward by 
eradicating the ‘illness’ model (Foudraine, 1974); Susie Orbach, whose book ‘Inside out, 
outside in’ (Eichenbaum and Orbach, 1983) turned me into a feminist overnight by 
demonstrating that my relationship with my mother had simply followed the emotional template 
of all mother-daughter relationships; and the school of Transactional Analysis, especially 
Steiner’s ‘Scripts people live’ (Steiner, 1990.) I should also mention the best single critique of 
the biomedical model of psychiatry that has ever been written, David Ingleby’s ‘Understanding 
mental illness’ (Ingleby, 1981). An academic psychologist at Cambridge University, he 
demolished the positivist paradigm in psychiatry with such thoroughness and panache that he 
aroused the anger of Sir Martin Roth, the founding President of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, and was forced to leave his post. 
 
I arrived on the clinical psychology course amazed at my luck in getting a place, full of passion 
and enthusiasm about mental health, and at the same time, still finding my feet after my 
breakdown at university. As a typical clinical psychology recruit, ie a bright, middle-class, 
young, white woman from a prestigious university, I am sure I was selected for all the wrong 
 25 
reasons. Nevertheless I soaked up the experiences that the course offered, while finding ample 
evidence of the destructive aspects of the biomedical model of mental distress. 
 
I was inspired by, among others, a supervisor who was particularly skilled in psychotherapy, and 
a psychiatrist who had worked with RD Laing and whose crisis intervention approach was based 
on a non-medical understanding of the reasons for psychiatric admissions. This man, Dennis 
Scott, was the author of a series of classic papers that have been a major influence on my 
thinking. In particular, I am indebted to him for the concept of the ‘treatment barrier’ (Scott, 
1973a and 1973b.) This is his term for the irrevocable drawing of the line between the ‘sick’ and 
the ‘well’ by the process of diagnosis, or in his words ‘the point at which inner disturbance in 
the family, which may have been present for years, or even generations, becomes officially 
located as being disturbance in one member’ (Scott, 1975, p. 6). Scott points out the curious 
paradox that in effect the diagnosis is often made by lay people, who have selected one member 
of the family or group as ‘the sick one.’ These lay people then put the professionals under 
enormous pressure to rubber-stamp this decision with a label - any label - of mental illness, 
while denying that they are so doing ‘(You’re the expert, doctor. He must be ill or he wouldn’t 
be here.’) The game will be exposed if the professional refuses to do this and instead tries to 
explore the dynamics that led up to the situation; the atmosphere can become very tense and 
threatening. However, if the professional gives in to pressure, an impenetrable barrier to 
working with the relationship issues, or in other words a ‘treatment barrier’, will be set up. The 
professionals are forced to take responsibility for the ‘sick’ person: ‘mutual and unbearable pain 
between two or more family members is avoided, but the cost is frightful…...(this) may result in 
the permanent….crippling of one or more lives’ (Scott, 1975, pp. 8-9 and see chapter 4 of 
‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’, Johnstone, 2000.) In my clinical work I have found this to be 
profoundly and tragically true. 
 
With my long-held views about the dangers of the biomedical model fully confirmed by my 
experiences in training, and equipped with new ways of thinking about mental distress, I was 
more than ready to go into battle in my first post. 
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2.5 First post in Adult Mental Health 1983-1985 
 
For the first ten years after qualification, I threw myself into clinical work. My first job was in a 
District General Hospital psychiatric unit in Luton. I started with the naïve aim of overthrowing 
the psychiatric system, and my outspokenness created enemies as quickly as it recruited fans. 
The job was a bumpy ride at times, but I learned a huge amount, which formed the basis of the 
first edition of my book, ‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’ (Johnstone, 1989.) 
 
2.6 ‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’, first edition 
 
‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’ was completed in 1987 when I was 31. My ambitious aim was 
to write a critical overview of every aspect of psychiatry, from theory to practice and from 
individual case histories to wider political interests, in a way that was accessible to service users 
and carers as well as professionals. I had long believed biomedical model psychiatry to be 
flawed in theory, and by now I had plenty of evidence of its profoundly damaging effects in 
practice. It was also a plea for a more psychologically sophisticated, socially aware and service-
user-centred approach to mental distress. The central thesis, which I hope is more convincing in 
context than it may sound as an extract, is: 
 
‘…..that social and political factors are a crucial component of mental distress; that through 
being identified with the wider system of society, psychiatry shares its values and assumptions; 
that the psychiatric system in its turn passes on these values and assumptions by a process of 
identification on the part of its staff and mystification on the part of its patients; that as a result 
the overall effect of psychiatry, if not the conscious intent of its practitioners, is to reinforce 
social norms and political interests; and that since none of this is made explicit, dissent can only 
emerge in the form of continued symptoms on the part of the patients. My further contention is 
that social control, the maintaining of society’s status quo by labelling dissent as illness, is 
actually the major function that wider society, consciously or unconsciously, expects and 
demands that psychiatry should fulfil; that while it is certainly not possible to explain all of an 
individual’s distress in these terms, psychiatry as a whole will be able to offer genuine help to 
people struggling within their systems only to the extent that it is aware of and successful in 
challenging its own role in the wider system of society; and that where it fails most 
spectacularly (women’s problems in general, ‘schizophrenia’, mental distress in ethic 
minorities) is also where such factors play the most important and ignored role in the problem. 
My final point is that the principal mechanism by which psychiatry performs its function of 
social control is the use of the medical model, that is, by propagating the myth that psychiatry is 
engaged in an objective, scientific enterprise to which medical science will one day produce the 
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solutions, which gives psychiatry powerful weapons for suppressing dissent (drugs, ECT) while 
enabling its true purpose to be concealed’ (Johnstone, 1989, pp. 246-247.) 
 
I wrote much of the book in my spare time after re-locating to Bristol. My research introduced 
me to other sources of inspiration. One was Richard Warner’s epic overview of recovery rates 
from ‘schizophrenia’, and its radical conclusion that psychiatry ideology goes in cycles, 
according to the economy’s need for recovered ‘schizophrenics’ in the workforce (Warner, 
2004; summarised in chapter 10 of ‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’.) In his words, ‘Ideology 
and practice in psychiatry, to a significant extent are at the mercy of material 
conditions…Efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate the chronically mentally ill will only be seen 
at times of extreme shortage of labour…At other times, the primary emphasis will be one of 
social control’ (Warner, 2004, pp.134, 145.) He demonstrates that at such times, psychiatry will 
turn to theories about biological and hereditary factors, with sufferers being seen as untreatable. 
His work provides some of the missing evidence for the ‘social control’ allegations made by the 
anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s. It will be interesting to see how his theories are borne 
out in the current recession. Although the reduction in hospital beds is unlikely to be reversed, 
there has already been a rise in prescriptions for psychiatric medication as more people become 
long-term patients in the community. 
 
Around this time I started to make contacts with other people whose critical perspective on 
psychiatry was a great source of support and encouragement. This included members of the 
service user/survivor movement, in particular Viv Lindow, one of the very earliest activists 
(Lindow, 1992.)  I have gained immensely from knowing and working with her and other 
survivor campaigners like Ron Coleman, Rufus May, Louise Pembroke, Jacqui Dillon, Jan 
Wallcraft, Jim Read, Ross Hughes and the late Linda Hart. I have also gained inspiration from 
other ‘critical psychologists’ such as Dorothy Rowe, David Smail, David Harper, John Read, 
Michele Roitt, David Winter, Craig Newnes and Mary Boyle, whose critique of psychiatric 
diagnosis has added rigour to my own (eg Boyle, 2002.) There is a small, courageous network of 
Critical Psychiatrists (www.critpsynet.freeuk.com), notably Phil Thomas, Pat Bracken, Duncan 
Double and Joanna Moncrieff, and I am pleased to have contributed to their conferences and 
their edited books.  
 
‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’ received a number of very favourable reader responses and 
reviews, both in its first and second edition (see ‘Reviews’ in Vol 3.) For example: 
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‘This book probably gives the best contemporary expression to the critique of the psychiatric 
system’ (Asylum 2000, 12 (2), p. 29.) 
 
‘Users and abusers of psychiatry is a model of a sophisticated critique of the mainstream 
medical model, showing a good understanding of the complexities of psychiatric theory and an 
impressive knowledge of the way that treatment actually affects people….I recommend it 
highly’ (www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc) 
 
‘This is an immensely enjoyable book that can be described, with only slight exaggeration, as a 
saturation bombing raid over the drug company funded territory of biomedical psychiatry’ 
(Mental Health Care 2000, 4 (2), pp. 72-73.) 
 
‘For brevity, clarity, and insightful honesty, this contemporary introduction of the ongoing 
struggle for a better future in our field is hard to beat’ (The Journal of Critical Psychology, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy 2001, 1 (2), pp.130-131.) 
 
‘Her analysis is calm, thorough and persuasive…Read it, think about it, argue with it, use it.’ 
(Openmind 2000, 105, p.26.) 
 
 It also attracted some criticism that was so extreme that I was able to re-interpret it as a 
compliment, and a confirmation of my main thesis that psychiatrists cannot afford to admit to 
the shaky theoretical basis of their practice. For example, one reviewer advised the publishers, 
‘It is an immoderate, tendentious and sexist polemic. I cannot recommend its publication.’ As if 
additional confirmation of the controversial nature of its arguments were needed, the book was 
put forward and then turned down for the MIND book of the year award in 1990. I was later told 
that the chair that year, Professor Anthony Clare, nominally a critic of psychiatry himself (see 
‘Psychiatry in dissent’1988), had blocked the committee’s desire to select it. 1990 remains the 
only year in which the award was not made.  
 
Writing the book in combination with a full-time job led to a long period of poor health, which 
was to become a familiar pattern.  
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2.7 Clinical work in Bristol 1985-1992 
 
I had posts in two hospitals when I moved to Bristol. One, Barrow Hospital, had a ward run by a 
very psychologically-minded consultant along therapeutic community lines. He remains 
someone that I respect for his commitment to pursuing an alternative approach in the face of 
considerable opposition. It was my first experience of working within a compatible philosophy, 
and I was able to help implement some new approaches to service users (see the case of 
‘Jeanette’ in ‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’, chapter 3.) Just across the pathway, in extreme 
contrast, another ward was run by an old-style consultant whose word – which usually consisted 
of prescribing ECT for any patient unfortunate enough to come his way - was law. When he was 
in a good mood he would regale the team with tales of administering ‘aqua ad caput’ (water to 
the head) in the early days of his career. Finding a role for myself on his ward, the first 
psychologist ever to do so, was not easy. Having learned a degree of tact, I wasn’t rash enough 
to be explicit about my rejection of ‘schizophrenia’ as a diagnosis, or my total opposition to the 
use of ECT, but I recall one incident when politely declining to administer a psychological test 
in order to determine whether a patient had ‘manic-depression’ caused considerable upset. I was 
accused of rudeness and of reducing one of the junior psychiatrists to tears.  
 
Subsequently, I was appointed to provide input to two newly-set-up wards on the outskirts of 
Bristol. It was a more liberal environment than Barrow, but still very medically-based. I felt 
accepted and respected by the ward teams and I look back on a number of achievements (setting 
up staff support groups, patient groups and so on) with satisfaction. The main consultant was 
someone I liked as a person but often disagreed with very openly (as described in the 1993a 
article quoted below.) Despite this, and I think he should take at least as much credit for this as 
me, we managed to maintain a working relationship and a personal friendship. Interestingly, he 
gradually became more radical later in his career, and his book ‘Recovery beyond psychiatry’ 
(Whitwell, 2005) talks a lot of sense about his gradual disillusionment with the biomedical 
model.  
 
2.8 Reflection on clinical work 1983-1992 
 
By now I had spent nearly 10 years wrestling with the dilemma of, as I put it in a recent chapter, 
‘challenge, compromise or avoidance as a response to traditional psychiatric practice. There are 
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no clear guidelines for indicating when compromise turns into collusion.  It is impossible to 
work as a critical psychologist on, for example, an in-patient ward and not collude to some 
extent; if you object to every use of psychiatric labelling, your role will be impossible’ 
(Johnstone, 2011, p. 102, Vol 3.)  
 
There is no easy answer to this dilemma. I have come to believe that the best we can do is to 
hope that overall, in working within psychiatry, we are doing more good than harm. I also 
believe that: 
 
‘Clinical psychologists who accept these critiques are faced with unavoidable ethical dilemmas 
about their role and work. The key question becomes not ‘How can we best use our scientific 
expertise to help the sick?’ but ‘How ought we to help the most disadvantaged members of our 
society when they are emotionally distressed?’ This quickly leads on to other questions  -‘How 
do we understand the reasons for their distress? What role ought we to play in alleviating these 
causes? And what are our professional and moral obligations as members of a society in which 
this kind of suffering occurs? ……An overwhelming amount of evidence tells us that as clinical 
psychologists we cannot afford to ignore the context of social inequality and injustice in our 
work, for scientific as well as ethical reasons. This will inevitably also involve us in challenging, 
not colluding with, some of the core tenets of biomedical psychiatry. In this way we will be 
facing ethical dilemmas head on, wherever we work, and fulfilling our moral and professional 
responsibilities as clinical psychologists’ (Johnstone, ibid, p 97.) 
 
My frustration was expressed in a 1993 article titled ‘Psychiatry: are we allowed to disagree?’ in 
Clinical Psychology Forum, the monthly journal for clinical psychologists (Johnstone, 1993a, 
Vol 3.) It generated a large postbag of responses from similarly disillusioned psychologists and 
was re-printed as part of a special selection of ‘Greatest Hits’ articles for the 100th edition of 
Forum. An extract in which I summarised the tactics that are used to maintain the primacy of 
biomedical explanations gives the flavour: 
 
‘Attributing all improvement to medical intervention. Since medication is constantly being 
adjusted, any change for the better will be bound to coincide with a new dosage and can be 
attributed to it. Conversely, progress in counselling is ascribed to other factors. When I reported 
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a very successful outcome to a long period of therapy with one inpatient, the consultant 
commented, ‘These conditions do go into remission sometimes.’ 
Belief in medical interventions is also maintained by disqualifying the counter-evidence. If ECT 
appears to ‘work’, then it will be used again. If it doesn’t ‘work’, then it will be used again in 
case it ‘works’ next time. There are no circumstances which would count as indications against 
its use. This is in marked contrast to non-medical interventions, where a single failure (eg a 
family who did not respond to family therapy) will be quoted for years to come. 
Quoting important-sounding research, for example, ‘It’s been proven that schizophrenics have 
lesions in their brains.’ This frequently bamboozles non-medical staff, who may not realise that 
there is no proven correlation, that even if there were it would not necessarily indicate a causal 
link, and that any research based on a dubious concept like ‘schizophrenia’ is seriously 
compromised from the start.’  
 
…..and so on (Johnstone, 1993a, p.32.) 
 
I was invited to submit a follow-up article in 2001 (‘Psychiatry: still disagreeing’, Johnstone, 
2001, Vol 3.)        
 
On an ironic note, a psychiatrist who had read the article kindly confirmed its central thesis in a 
response titled ‘The re-emergence of anti-psychiatry: psychiatry under threat’ in which he 
lamented the fact that I would doubtless ‘be teaching the next generation of clinical 
psychologists that mental illness does not exist. The only comfort from this paper is…that, 
where she previously worked, the nonmedical staff still consider psychiatrists to be “the most 
powerful professional group”’(Marks, 1994, p.188.)   
 
I had become increasingly frustrated at having reached the age of some of the younger 
consultants, and yet knowing I would never be in a position to implement radical changes 
myself. As a psychologist, I could not run a ward, or make or unmake decisions about diagnosis, 
admission, medication or ECT. I had influence, but very little formal power. A lecturing post in 
clinical psychology and counselling at the University of the West of England offered an 
alternative career route, and I left the NHS for higher education. 
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2.9 Lecturing in higher education 1992 -2001 
 
I remember the next 9 years as a very unhappy time workwise, although it also saw the births of 
my two children, Alissa in 1993 and Alex in 1996. On the one hand, I had freedom of speech as 
an academic, and used it to good effect in introducing a critical approach to mental health to 
psychology undergraduates, psychiatric nurses, counselling students and social workers, which 
was very well received. For the first time in my career I could openly question psychiatric 
diagnosis and biomedical theories, and far from attacking my views, my academic colleagues, 
who had no personal investment in any particular perspective, welcomed this novel and 
challenging approach. On the other hand, the bureaucracy and workload were overwhelming, 
particularly combined with two young children, two miscarriages, a termination of pregnancy 
under traumatic circumstances, and the general lack of sleep that goes with caring for babies and 
toddlers. I missed clinical work and never felt that I entirely fitted into the academic world.  
 
I did, however, produce the 2nd edition of my book (Johnstone, 2000) which was essentially a 
complete re-write. The first edition now seems exceptionally naïve and dated to me, and 
although the re-write alongside a full-time job and family commitments was a vastly over-
ambitious undertaking which again led to ill-health, I am pleased that I did it.  
 
Another achievement while at UWE was the publication of a qualitative study into the 
experience of receiving ECT (Johnstone, 1999a, Vol 3.) I had long been concerned with the 
neglected psychological impact of this controversial intervention. My previous clients included 
a woman who made a very serious suicide attempt when she felt herself sliding into depression, 
because she could not bear the prospect of being forced to have ECT again, and a mute in-
patient woman who one day managed to confide to me that she had miscarried her much-wanted 
baby as a result of ECT and had then been sterilised without her consent. I also got to know a 
furious, distrustful woman who had been gang-raped, a horrific experience which she re-lived 
under ECT when the anaesthetic failed to work and she lay paralysed but conscious on the bed. 
There were many other examples. I wanted to give these people a voice in the official literature 
so that their stories were accorded a higher status than ‘anecdotal evidence.’ I am proud that the 
publication formed the basis of recognition by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) that some people experience ‘feelings of terror, shame and distress, and found it 
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positively harmful and an abusive invasion of personal autonomy’ (NICE, 2003, p.15). As far as 
I am aware, this is the first official acknowledgement of psychological trauma caused by ECT.  
 
The study also led to an advisory role on the ECT subcommittee of the Department of Health 
scoping study on the 1993 Mental Health Act; a presentation to the All-Party Special Interest 
Group on Depression at the Houses of Parliament in 1999; and membership of the reference 
group for the Department of Health/Service Users in Research Enterprise review of user 
literature on ECT (SURE, 2002.) In addition, I was asked to produce the British Psychological 
Society’s Position Statement on ECT (which formed the basis of an article in The Psychologist, 
Johnstone, 2003, Vol 3.) I was a little worried about my conclusion, which was that the evidence 
did not support the use of ECT in any clinical situation. When I rang the BPS to discuss this, I 
was assured that the committee that approved position statements did not include any clinical 
psychologists and would be unaware of the controversial nature of this recommendation, and so 
it proved. Although I doubt that many clinical psychologists are aware of it, their official body is 
now formally opposed to the use of ECT in any circumstances! 
 
My time at UWE saw publications in another key area of interest, family work with 
‘schizophrenia’. This has been a highly controversial topic since the 1960s, when Laing was 
accused of blaming parents for their children’s ‘schizophrenia.’ This is completely missing the 
point: Laing was very clear that ‘we do not accept “schizophrenia” as being a biochemical, 
neurophysiological, psychological fact…Nor do we assume its existence. Nor do we adopt it as 
a hypothesis. We propose no model of it’ (Laing and Esterson 1964, p.12.) The accusations 
have, however, been a convenient and effective way of dismissing the psychodynamic 
perspective on so-called ‘schizophrenia’ in favour of a biomedical one, which is absolutely 
crucial if the status of ‘schizophrenia’ as ‘the prototypical psychiatric disease’ (Boyle 2002) and 
‘the heartland of psychiatry’ (Goodwin and Geddes, 2007, p.189) is to be maintained. In fact, to 
deny that people go mad for reasons – or, to put it more bluntly, crazy people often come from 
crazy families – is unsustainable in theory or practice. A version of CBT-based family work has 
become very popular by basing itself on the careful concession that the quality of family 
relationships can inhibit or promote recovery from psychosis, although family dynamics have 
nothing to do with breaking down in the first place. I deconstructed this contradictory position in 
an article (Johnstone, 1993b, Vol 3) which led to a somewhat acrimonious debate in two 
journals (Lam and Kuipers, 1993; Leff and Vaughn, 1994.) Although two eminent family work 
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researchers asserted that my article ‘impugns our integrity as scientists’ (Leff and Vaughn, 1994, 
p.115), it has been widely cited. I presented my version of the research findings in relation to 
family dynamics in ‘schizophrenia’ at the 1997 international conference of the International 
Society for the Psychological Treatments of the Schizophrenias and other Psychoses (ISPS) and 
subsequently wrote the talk up as a book chapter (Johnstone, 1999b, Vol 3.) 
 
Thanks to my time at UWE I became an experienced and confident teacher and public speaker, 
but I missed the direct contact with clients. I loved my time with the future mental health 
professionals (psychiatric nurses and social workers), but as a high achiever myself, I became 
increasingly discouraged by what I saw as the erosion of academic standards and the 
impossibility of allowing any undergraduate to fail. I also felt too distant from my roots as a 
clinician. It was time to move on. 
 
2.10 Lecturing on the Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate 2001 - 2010  
 
An exciting opportunity arrived on my doorstep in the form of the newly-set-up Bristol 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, which was initially based at the University of the West of 
England and subsequently moved into premises at Bristol University. In 2001 I was accepted for 
the job of academic tutor, and was promoted to Academic Director in 2004 and Programme 
Director in 2008. I also returned to clinical work part-time and with renewed enthusiasm, 
although feeling a little rusty after the long gap. I was influential in shaping the direction of the 
doctorate course and developing its unique version of the reflective scientist-practitioner 
philosophy, which we described as follows in the course handbook (Bristol Trainee Handbook 
2007, pp. 9-10, Vol 3): 
 
‘While emphasising the importance of evidence-based practice, we also recognise some of the 
limitations of a pure scientist-practitioner model. In acknowledging this, we seek to encourage 
trainees to:  
a) Develop and draw on a broad range of evidence and skills in their work. This particularly 
applies to clinical practice, where empirical evidence may be lacking and practitioners need to 
respond creatively and flexibly in complex, uncertain or unique real life situations. Effective 
skills are likely to be based on tacit knowledge gained from clinical experience, as well as on 
academic theory. These skills will be refined via a continual process of reflection. 
b) Develop an awareness of their own feelings and processes, and the part that they as a person, 
with their individual history, background, experiences and values, play in all aspects of the work 
of a psychologist. This implies a continuing process of personal development occurring in 
parallel with, and contributing to, the acquisition of clinical, academic and research skills. 
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c) Consider the widest possible perspective and range of evidence in order to take a 
constructively questioning approach to all aspects of theory and practice. This will include an 
awareness of the influence of social, historical and cultural factors in constructing the role and 
knowledge-base of clinical psychologists and related professions.’ 
 
In partnership with colleagues, I devised and delivered much of the reflective practice theme 
(Johnstone and Staite, 2010, in Clinical Psychology Forum 213, Vol 3) and the critical approach 
to theory and practice (Johnstone, 2010, in Clinical Psychology Forum 213, Vol 3; AMH 
teaching block outline and feedback, Vol 3) which, along with Health Psychology, were the core 
characteristics of the course.  
 
Teaching a ‘critical’ perspective brings its own risks. For reasons of both intellectual 
transparency and political pragmatism, we explicitly decided not to promote a particular view on 
mental health or anything else. Instead, the Trainee Handbook (Vol 2) advised: 
‘We provide opportunities for trainees to, for example, hear from speakers who argue both for 
and against biological, psychodynamic, CBT, systemic and social perspectives; both for and 
against formulation, diagnosis and evidence-based practice; and many other issues…...Similarly, 
guest speakers will include psychiatrists, psychologists, academics, carers, advocates and 
service users, and trainees will be encourages to understand and debate all of these viewpoints 
as a way of coming to their own conclusions and developing their own very individual synthesis 
of the views they are exposed to. Our concern is not to produce trainees of any specific 
orientation, but to ensure that all graduates base their eventual perspective and personal style on 
a thorough and thoughtful consideration of all aspects of the areas in question.’ 
 
This explicit stance shielded us from most, though not all, accusations of bias, brain-washing 
and so on.  Introducing trainees to a critical perspective on mental health was very challenging 
but ultimately rewarding for them: ‘ Regarding my experience of the critical perspective of the 
course, I can only compare it to psychology boot camp: it broke us down and built us back up! 
..Within months….I was questioning ideas and “facts” that hadn’t even occurred to me to 
question at all. Honestly, I can’t say that was a nice place to be…..I feel very privileged to have 
been on a course where teaching from a critical perspective has been strong since the start….I 
am incredibly proud to be associated with a course which values the critical consumption of 
research, ideas and “truth”’ (Johnstone, 2010, Clinical Psychology Forum 213, p.17, Vol 3.) The 
course quickly gained a good reputation and attracted a very high number of applicants. 
 
It was a delight to update my mental health teaching for successive cohorts of bright, motivated 
trainees. I had never really considered a career in clinical psychology training, but when the 
opportunity came up, I found that in combination with part-time clinical work it was the perfect 
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solution to the dilemma of whether to work inside or outside the psychiatric system. It was also 
the ideal way to utilise all my abilities to the full in order to help develop a course that reflected 
my own beliefs and values. It was hugely rewarding to see the course develop in philosophy, 
content and reputation, and to see its values embodied by successive cohorts of enthusiastic 
young graduates, setting out on their careers, as I had done, full of drive and idealism.  
 
Trainees were also able to benefit from my reflections on my own early immaturity, and adopt a 
more sophisticated approach to any challenges that they might wish to make (we did not assume 
that this was inevitable.) The principles that emerged over many discussions with trainees were: 
 
• take your time  
• gain credibility by willingness to take on the most challenging service users 
• build respectful relationships with teams before attempting to change anything  
• choose your battles  
• find your allies  
• challenge ideas not people 
• remember that even in the most entrenched hospital system, the vehicle of change is the 
personal relationship you have with the service user. 
 
Each cohort was set the task of drawing up their own list of strategies for surviving in and/or 
introducing change into the psychiatric system (Trainee list of coping strategies: Vol 3.)  
 
The course also allowed me to develop my thinking, teaching and writing on my critiques of 
psychiatry, focusing on psychiatric diagnosis (in which I drew on important earlier work by 
Boyle, 2002) as the foundation of the biomedical model in psychiatry. In the words of Kovel 
(1981, p. 86), ‘Diagnosis is the Holy Grail of psychiatry and the key to its legitimation.’ While 
these themes had been strongly present in ‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’, I was able to 
elaborate on them in three book chapters (Johnstone, 2006a, Vol 2; Johnstone, 2008b; 
Johnstone, in press c) and in teaching sessions delivered on the Bristol course and also by 
invitation at clinical psychology courses across the country (Plymouth, Exeter, Cardiff, Oxford, 
University of East London, Hertfordshire, Salomons, Shropshire and Staffordshire.) These have 
been consistently well-received (see Vol 3 for teaching sessions on Psychiatric Diagnosis and 
Biomedical Models and feedback.)  
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An extract from a chapter (Johnstone, 2006a, p. 84, Vol 2) gives the essence of my critique of 
diagnosis:   
 
 ‘Psychiatry needs to be able to claim that it has a valid and reliable classification system, 
because this is absolutely crucial to its status as a legitimate branch of science – in this case, 
medical science. As psychiatrist Michael Shepherd puts it, “To discard classification is to 
discard scientific thinking” (1976). If there is no agreement on basic classification, then there is 
no basis for drawing up the general laws that constitute a body of scientific knowledge. The 
implications are profound: if classification can be shown to be neither reliable nor valid, then 
everything that follows from the biomedical assumptions outlined above, our current 
interventions, settings, professionals, up to and including the language we use, would need 
fundamental revision.  Hence the statement, ‘The critique of diagnosis is the critique of 
psychiatry’ (Brown,1990).’  
 
I then argue that psychiatric diagnosis cannot be shown to be either reliable or valid, because in 
the absence of confirming ‘signs’ such as blood cell counts, genetic abnormalities etc it has to 
rely on ‘symptoms’ that are not bodily complaints, but examples of problematic thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours. Since there can in principle be no objective way of drawing a line 
between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ experiences of this kind, any pretence of doing so must in fact 
be based solely on implicit personal and cultural values. In other words, to give someone a 
psychiatric diagnosis is to make a social, not medical, judgement. While the people to whom 
diagnoses are applied may indeed be distressed and in need of some kind of help, there is no 
medical justification for inviting them into a psychiatric career by turning ‘people with 
problems’ into ‘patients with illnesses.’ Both the chapters and the workshops argue that 
formulation is a viable and valid alternative to diagnosis, and that by using formulation as a 
starting point, the whole destructive cycle of re-abuse within a psychiatric career can be 
avoided. 
 
Another recent area of interest, a logical step on from my critiques of family work and 
‘schizophrenia’, is the increasingly widely-recognised role of trauma in the development of 
psychosis (as well as in other mental health conditions.) I have been inspired by the work of 
John Read, a New Zealand-based clinical psychologist whose life’s mission is to raise 
awareness of the shockingly high prevalence of trauma and abuse in psychosis. He has 
assembled a range of evidence which demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that the 
relationship between trauma and psychosis is a causal one. I summarised this in a forthcoming 
book chapter (Johnstone, in press a, Vol 3): 
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‘Trauma, in this body of work, refers mainly but not exclusively to events in childhood, and 
includes physical and sexual abuse and general neglect; and ‘psychosis’ includes 
‘schizophrenia’ and ‘bipolar disorder’ (eg Garno et al, 2005; Hammersley et al, 2003) as well as 
specific ‘symptoms’ such as delusions and hallucinations. Some surveys have also included the 
role of experiences such as war, torture and natural disasters (eg Scott et al, 2007.) 
 
• There is a general relationship between child abuse and adult pathology of all types, but this 
has typically been ignored or downplayed in relation to psychosis. 
• Childhood abuse and neglect is as least as strongly linked to psychosis as to other psychiatric 
conditions, and the link appears to be a causal one. 
• There is also evidence for a link between psychosis and trauma in adult life (see Fowler et al, 
2006 for a summary.) 
• There is some evidence linking particular kinds of abuse experience with particular 
‘symptoms’ (eg CSA seems to be a stronger causal factor than CPA for auditory 
hallucinations; see summary in Read et al, 2006.). 
• The content of ‘delusions’ is often closely related to actual experiences of CA. 
• Cognitive theories suggest that unintegrated memories of abuse may lead to cognitive 
misattributions (eg about where voices come from.) ‘Delusions’ may be a defence against 
overwhelming feeling. 
 
‘……..(E)vidence for a causal role for trauma in the development of psychosis includes the 
finding of a dose-dependent relationship between the severity (Janssen et al, 2004, Spauwen et 
al, 2006), number (Whitfield et al, 2005), and number of types (Scott et al 2007) of traumatic 
episodes, and the probability of subsequent symptoms. The relationship between trauma and 
abuse has been found to hold in prospective studies (Janssen et al 2004; Spauwen et al, 2006) 
and after controlling for factors such as substance abuse, ethnicity, gender and education 
(Bebbington et al, 2004; Whitfield et al, 2005.) People who are abused as children are 9.3 times 
more likely to develop psychosis, while for those suffering the severest kinds of abuse the risk 
rises to 48 times (Janssen et al, 2004.)’ 
 
It is curious, and humbling, to reflect that for the first 10 years or so of my training and career, I 
had never knowingly met any victims of sexual abuse. Obviously there must have been many of 
them, and indeed I have been able to follow up some early clients who have since revealed such 
histories. My self-imposed penance is to do all I can to raise awareness of the issue with trainees 
and clinical teams.  I vividly recall one highly disturbed young woman with a diagnosis of 
‘schizophrenia’ –defined as such by the family, as per Scott’s work, a label which was eagerly 
confirmed by the psychiatrist – whose ‘delusion’ was that men were coming through her 
bedroom walls at night and raping her. This was too obvious a clue for me to miss, even back in 
1990, and I raised my suspicions with the consultant only to have them completely discounted. 
15 years later I bumped into her at a conference. She told me that she had finally escaped from 
both her family and the psychiatric system with the support of a voluntary mental health 
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organisation. She also told me, ‘It wasn’t just my father who was sexually abusing me. It was 
my mother as well.’  
 
John Read is optimistic about the impact of the evidence about trauma: ‘….the entire construct 
of schizophrenia receives arguably its largest challenge since its inception’ (Read, 1997, p. 449). 
I am more cautious. My chapter welcomes this body of work, but at the same time warns of the 
various manoeuvres that are likely to strip it of its radical implications – for example, creating a 
sub-category of ‘traumatic psychosis’ but retaining a biomedical model for other 
‘schizophrenics’; and indeed the use of the term ‘psychosis’ itself, a category error which reifies 
a set of experiences that are perhaps best understood, quite simply, as reactions to extreme 
trauma. As I put it in another article, ‘There is the abuse, and there are the effects of the abuse. 
There is no additional ‘psychosis’ that needs explaining’ (Johnstone, 2008a, p.8.) 
 
There are clear links between the evidence that many, perhaps nearly all, cases of ‘psychosis’ 
can be understood as the consequence of trauma, and the need for a formulation-led rather than a 
diagnostic approach in psychiatry. In the words of Jacqui Dillon, Chair of the Hearing Voices 
Network England and herself a survivor of psychiatry and of abuse: ‘Instead of asking “What is 
wrong with you?” we need to ask “What has happened to you?”’ 
 
The Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate was the main impetus for my increased interest in the 
concept of formulation, which had always been a central part of my work with service users but 
had not previously been the subject of my teaching, training, writing or research. I devised and 
helped to deliver the teaching on formulation, including assignments, marking criteria, teaching, 
workshops, and essays. I was granted a short sabbatical to edit ‘Formulation in psychology and 
psychotherapy: making sense of people’s problems (Johnstone and Dallos, 2006b, PW 4.2.1. 
and 4.2.2.) All of this is described in more detail in Part 3. 
 
2.10.1 Closure of the Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate 
 
The context in which I am reflecting on my work in formulation as a possible way forward in 
my career, is the closure of the Bristol Doctorate. While I do not want to make this loss my main 
focus, some background might be helpful.  
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In 2005 the host university of the Bristol Doctorate, Plymouth, decided to seek a local home for 
the course. After a selection process that was widely felt to be unsatisfactory, several candidates 
were rejected in favour of Bath University. It quickly became clear that Bath had very different 
plans for the course in terms of philosophy and content, and that our jobs could not be 
guaranteed for long. For two and a half years, Bath held the legal status of ‘preferred bidder’ 
while breaking numerous deadlines for signing the contract. Given complete uncertainty about 
the future, 14 staff including the then course director resigned over this period. Official 
complaints to the British Psychological Society resulted in a formal investigation into Bath’s 
plans, which in turn led to accreditation problems and the cancellation of their projected first 
intake of trainees. Eventually Bath University withdrew at the end of 2008, and I stepped into 
the role of course director.  
 
At this point, we hoped that an alternative host university would be sought. However, Plymouth 
University immediately announced that they would not be seeking to transfer the course again 
but would be closing it and making all staff redundant in September 2010. The SHA then 
commissioned a new course, rather than a transfer of the existing one. There was widespread 
astonishment when Bath won the contract for the second time. Bath is currently in the process of 
setting up their very different course, while the Bristol course closed in September 2010.  
 
It would not be fair to see the events outlined above solely as a response to the course’s 
reflective and critical perspective, although that was part of the picture. We were caught up in 
wider political factors, many of which remain obscure to us. However, it is not a coincidence 
that our course is being replaced by one that is a model of clinical psychology orthodoxy – 
strongly CBT-focused, heavily research-oriented, sceptical about the role of personal 
development and drawing only from a narrow range of ‘evidence-based’ theories and practices. 
This fits with wider Government agendas and with the preferences of influential local clinicians. 
The 6-year disaster has resulted in much ‘victim-blaming’, and I and other senior colleagues 
have been made aware that a number of local job options (including Bath) are now closed to us. 
In the process, some of the few critical voices within clinical psychology training have been 
silenced. 
 
As part of the closure process, we decided to describe the unique features of the Bristol course 
in a special edition of the monthly journal for clinical psychologists, Clinical Psychology 
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Forum, which I edited (see Clinical Psychology Forum 213, 2010 in Vol 3.) Our intention was 
to ensure that our learning, ideas and expertise were not lost to the wider training community. 
The journal editor notes that ‘Bristol….had earned great respect and support within the training 
community in the UK. I am particularly pleased, therefore, that we have been able to produce 
this issue as a celebration of the achievements and good practice promoted at Bristol. Bristol’s 
ethos will hopefully live on….through the cohorts of trainees who have graduated in the last 
decade’ (Turpin, 2010, p.6.)  Despite the closure of the course, I am proud to have contributed to 
these achievements. I believe that I and my team managed to bring the course to as successful a 
closure as was possible, retaining our dignity and our commitment to the trainees to the end. 
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VOLUME 1 PART 3 
 
THE PUBLIC WORKS 
 
3.1 Overview of Part 3 
 
In Part 2, I described the personal, intellectual and professional context within which my interest 
in formulation has arisen. My critiques of biomedical psychiatry in general, and of psychiatric 
diagnosis in particular, underpin and set the scene for this development. As I have argued in a 
series of articles, chapters and presentations, diagnosis is both the foundation on which 
psychiatric theory is built, and from the service user’s perspective, the starting point of the 
profoundly damaging process of turning ‘people with problems’ into ‘patients with illnesses.’ If 
diagnosis were to be replaced by a credible alternative, then everything else in psychiatry would 
have to change too. Over the last 4-5 years I have come to believe that formulation has the 
potential to be that alternative. Formulation has thus become the main focus of my work.  
 
In Part 3 of the context statement, I will describe four main areas in which I have sought to 
develop the theory and practice of formulation and to promote its wider acceptance as a way 
forward for mental health services. These areas, and the Public Works that link to them, are: 
 
The Formulation Theme on the Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate  
                
(see Public Works in Volume 1, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.)                
 
 ‘Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy: making sense of people’s problems’ 
(Johnstone and Dallos, 2006b) including:  
 
• Further work on Integrated Formulation  
 
(see Public Works in Volume 1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3.)            
                          
 43 
Using formulation in teams, including: 
 
• My own clinical practice, using individual and team formulations 
 
• Trainee research projects on team formulation 
 
• Workshops and training on team formulation 
 
  (see Public Works in Volume 1, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3.)          
                        
 
Promoting formulation for culture change, including: 
 
• Using team formulations to raise awareness of trauma and abuse 
 
• Formulation as an alternative to diagnosis   
 
• Formulation as a radical act  
 
(See Public Works in Volume 1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2.)       
                     .  
3.2 Formulation Theme on the Bristol Clinical Psychology Doctorate (links to PW 4.1.1 and 
4.1.2.) 
 
As co-ordinator of the Formulation Theme (a ‘theme’ being our version of a module), I took the 
lead on devising the structure, content and marking criteria, on organising and delivering the 
teaching and on marking the assignments, but was well supported by clinical psychology 
colleagues both on the course and in local services. At the time there was little to draw on in the 
literature, and the guidelines that I gave to the trainees were based mainly on my clinical 
experience. Across the 3 years, the theme was built up as follows: 
 
Year 1.  
 - Introduction to the core therapeutic models of the course, and their approaches to formulation. 
 - Session on introduction to formulation (see Year 1 formulation teaching, Vol 2.) 
 - The Formulation Day. 4 clinicians (staff and local psychologists) presented a formulation of 
an actual AMH client, from one of 4 therapeutic perspectives, which was used as a basis for 
drawing up an integrated version, debating issues and controversies about formulation, and 
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participating in. a role-play about a team discussion of the client, in which trainees were invited 
to role-play a formulation-based perspective on the client’s difficulties (see Formulation Day 
handbook including extra material, Vol 2.)   
 - A task-based learning assignment. Groups of trainees had 6 weeks to produce a presentation 
of an integrated formulation of an actual client case which was described by a local clinician, 
drawing on the course teaching and resources and their knowledge (PW 4.1.1). Trainees wrote a 
short reflective essay on their experience of the group work  
 
Year 2  
 - Trainees were required to produce a 3,000 word formulation of a Child and an Older Adult 
client, presented by a local clinician, under similar headings to the TBL task (PW 4.1.2). The 
clinician returned at a later date in order to share their own formulation of the client and his/her 
subsequent progress. 
 - Trainees were also asked to write up 4 case studies during the course, each of which had to 
contain a formulation (see criteria in Trainee Handbook, Vol 3.).  
 - Some cohorts were asked to write an essay on a topic of their choice related to formulation. 
 
Year 3  
 - I gave teaching sessions on Integrated Formulation and Using Formulation in Teams (see Vol 
2.) 
 - Throughout the 3 years, drawing up formulations under supervision was a key aspect of 
placement experience. 
 
The theme developed into a coherent progression from single-model to integrated formulations, 
and from using formulation with individuals to using it with teams and to create culture change. 
Throughout, close links were maintained with local practitioners, who presented actual 
examples of their client work as material for the trainees, and who co-facilitated the day 
workshops. All the teaching, but particularly the formulation day, was evaluated extremely 
positively. I and Rudi Dallos presented this work in 2006 at the conference for clinical 
psychology trainers (see Vol 2.) 
 
 The course’s emphasis on formulation inspired some of our trainees to choose this as the topic 
for their doctoral research project under my supervision, and several of these studies are about to 
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be published (Cole and Johnstone, in press; Cole and Johnstone, in press; Christofides, 
Johnstone and Musa, in press, abstract in 4.3.3, full version in Vol 2; Hood and Johnstone, 2010, 
unpublished, abstract in 4.3.3, full version in Vol 2; Ray and Johnstone, 2008, unpublished; 
Redhead and Johnstone, 2010, unpublished.) 
 
3.3 ‘Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy: making sense of people’s problems’ 
(eds L Johnstone and R Dallos, 2006b) (links to PW 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.) 
 
As described in chapter one of ‘Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy’, the concept of 
formulation is not new, and it is a central feature of most, though not all, therapeutic approaches. 
However, at the start of the Doctorate in 2001 remarkably little had been written about the 
subject. The main existing text was based only on CBT (Bruch and Bond, 1998) and there was 
nothing at all from the reflective and critical perspective that we adopted. This inspired me and 
colleagues from the Exeter and Plymouth courses to put on some workshops for psychologists in 
the area in 2002.  From this it became clear that we had tapped into an under-explored area of 
considerable interest. Rudi Dallos and I went on to edit our book, using the same AMH client 
case as the basis for the chapters. Our collaborator from the Exeter course, the then course 
director Willem Kuyken, has taken the theme in a slightly different direction and is now the co-
author of a book and various articles on formulation in CBT (Kuyken, Padesky and Dudley, 
2009.)  
 
Rudi’s and my book is now a recommended text on many clinical psychology courses, and a 
second edition has been commissioned. Reviewers have commented (see ‘Reviews’ in Vol 2): 
 
‘Buy this book! It is a clear and well-articulated approach to formulation in the psychological 
psychotherapies….It will take its place as required reading on training courses.’ Clinical 
Psychology Forum, 2007 (175). 
 
‘A lot of thought-provoking material and practical guidance is packed into this excellent text 
and it is likely to become an accessible classic of its kind.’ Therapy Today, 2008  (Sept). 
 
‘I see this book as a boon to both trainees and qualified therapists, whichever theoretical 
perspective they work in.’ Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy.  
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‘The book will be invaluable to people entering training, and to specialists who want to update 
their knowledge of other approaches….Most important, the book provides a refreshingly critical 
perspective on various claims made about clinical psychology, without undermining clinicians’ 
concern to do something useful.’ Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 2007 
(17.) 
 
‘The final chapter is quite brilliant, and is the best account I have seen of the whole question of 
categorising clients…This is a very worthwhile book, and could be a revelation to anyone 
reading it.’ John Rowan on amazon.co.uk, 23.11.2008 
 
The first chapter (PW 4.2.1) introduces the subject of formulation, and the last one, 
‘Controversies and debates in formulation’ (PW 4.2.2), is as far as I am aware the only 
published literature to examine the subject from a critical angle. This is in keeping with my 
commitment to maintaining a critical perspective even in those areas (psychotherapy, 
formulation, social inequalities approaches, the service user movement) which are closest to my 
own principles and values. 
 
3.3.1 Further work on Integrative Formulation 
 
The chapter that is perhaps in most need of updating is the one on Integrative Formulation. 
Since the book came out in 2006, I have devised a one-day workshop on this subject, which has 
twice been delivered as a Division of Clinical Psychology CPD event, and repeated by invitation 
at various other locations round the country (PW 4.2.3; feedback in Vol 2.) When I started to 
explore this aspect of formulation, I was surprised to find that although clinical psychologists 
are supposed to be trained to ‘derive a formulation…..which incorporates interpersonal, societal, 
cultural and biological factors’ (DCP, 2010), virtually nothing at all has been written about how 
to create this kind of integrated summary.  
 
One of the very few exceptions is the Weereskera framework in ‘Multiperspective case 
formulation’ (1996.) However, close inspection reveals the rather serious limitation that 
Weerasekera’s grid does not, in fact, result in an integrated formulation. Rather, it is a way of 
collecting together the various factors that might be included in such a formulation, with little 
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regard for whether or not they might be theoretically compatible. In other words, it is an 
example of what one of the participants in a trainee project described as ‘a diagnostic style of 
formulation which is just a list of problems….an inflexible and concrete bunch of ideas’ (Ray 
and Johnstone, 2008.) ’ I would see this as an example of eclecticism, defined as ‘an empirical, 
atheoretical mixing of various methods from different therapies’ rather than integrationism, 
defined as ‘drawing from a variety of models to create a new integrated and conceptually 
superior model’ (Weerasekera, 1996.)                        
 
One of the dimensions of the grid is ‘Biological’ – which, unless carefully defined, invites the 
formulator to add in a psychiatric diagnosis, or a phrase such as ‘genetic vulnerability to 
schizophrenia.’  As I argue in my workshop (PW 4.2.3), this kind of eclecticism, where 
biomedical and psychosocial factors are simply added together, does not make sense. The two 
models are based on different, indeed contradictory assumptions: ‘You have a medical illness 
with primarily biological causes’ versus ‘Your problems are an understandable emotional 
response to your life circumstances.’  This leads to all the contradictions of psychiatric practice, 
and the mixed messages to service users that I have summarised as ‘You have an illness which 
is not your fault, BUT you retain responsibility for it and must make an effort to get better BUT 
you must do it our way because we are the experts in your illness.’ This kind of muddled 
thinking, and the muddled practice that flows from it, is routine in psychiatric settings.  
 
While some successful examples of integrated therapy do exist (eg Cognitive Analytic Therapy, 
Ryle and Kerr 2002), I have yet to find a satisfactory set of integration principles or guidelines 
for achieving integration, either in therapy as a whole or in formulation as a central aspect. This 
is curious, given that most clinical psychologists and therapists say that they work integratively 
(McLeod, 2009.) I suspect that in practice this is more likely to be eclecticism.  
 
A slide from the Integrated Formulation workshop (PW 4.2.3) illustrates some of the unresolved 
issues: 
 
Some therapeutic models may be incompatible. In this case they would only open to eclectism, 
not integrationism, and would be internally contradictory. These incompatibilities indicate 
different philosophical assumptions about human beings 
For eg: 
 - Agency. Are we in control of our lives and actions (humanistic therapies), or simply 
responding to our environments (strict behaviourism) or our internal drives (psychoanalysis) or 
biochemical imbalances (psychiatry)? 
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 - Are we essentially loving and well-intentioned (humanistic) or in a constant battle to keep 
instinctual drives under control (psychoanalysis) or do we react to our environment in a morally 
neutral way (behaviourism)? 
 - Is the ‘problem’ in mental distress within our minds (cognitive therapy; psychology in general) 
or our bodies (psychiatry) or in society (community psychology)? 
 
At the same time, I agree with Fear and Woolfe 2000, p. 331 (in Palmer and Woolfe, 2000) that 
integration must be attempted: ‘The counsellor’s journey towards integration mirrors the client’s 
central if unconscious task in therapy: to join up the discontinuities of one’s life so that…..”cut 
off” parts (are) reintegrated and accepted….It is the task of the counsellor to….achieve a 
personal integration.’ 
 
As a first step towards a conceptual framework, I have drawn up a checklist of principles for 
integrated formulations:  
 
• Awareness of other models 
• Inclusion of key strengths of other models 
• Awareness of own values 
• Culturally sensitive 
• Collaborative 
• Provisional 
• Expressed in everyday language 
• Alternative to, not addition to, psychiatric diagnosis 
 
           I have also suggested that integrative formulations should seek a balance between: 
 
• Inner and outer worlds 
• Thinking, feeling and behaving 
• Past, present and future 
• Introspection and action 
• Strengths and difficulties 
• Symbolic meanings and real life facts 
• Transference and collaboration 
• Individual agency and social pressures 
• Individual and family/systemic perspectives 
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(see PW 4.2.3) 
 
In addition, I suggest four main formats for constructing a written formulation (PW 4.2.3.) 
These are: Inner world to outer world; past to present; core theme, such as separation 
difficulties, or unresolved trauma; or selecting a primary model and adding to it. Some 
psychologists and psychiatrists like the PPPP (pre-disposing, precipitating, perpetuating and 
protective factors) format. I dislike it because, like the Weerasekera equivalent, it does not 
actually integrate. It is also frequently used to add ‘genetic vulnerability to schizophrenia’, or 
similar, into the ‘predisposing’ heading.  
 
Despite the challenges it presents, integration is, in my view, one of the essential characteristics 
of team formulations, as I will discuss below. 
 
3.4 Using formulation in teams (links to PW 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3.) 
 
3.4.1 My own clinical practice, using individual and team formulations 
 
I have always seen formulations as a central aspect of my work with individual service users 
(see ‘Sarah’ in Vol 1 Part 1, and further examples in Vol 2.) In the last three years I have 
become very interested in one particular application of formulation: using formulation within 
teamwork. By this I mean the process of facilitating a whole team to come up with agreed and 
shared formulations for the kind of complex and challenging clients who constitute an 
increasing amount of mental health services’ work.  
 
My interest and indeed awareness of this as a specific area of clinical practice stems from my 
time in an AMH community mental health team where I worked one day a week for a period of 
two years from 2004-2006. It occurred to me that offering to co-construct formulations for 
complex and challenging service users with the team, and using this a basis for the team’s 
interventions, would be a useful way of making the most of my limited time. I hoped to enhance 
the team’s understanding and care planning without necessarily taking on every service user for 
individual work. It was also a good way of involving trainees on placement with the kind of 
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service user that they would not usually be expected to take on while still in training. The 
approach I developed was: 
 
• Ask the team if there are any service users who are experienced as challenging, frustrating or 
‘stuck.’ (This is a risky strategy since it instantly results in a long list of the most complex service 
users in the service!) 
• Read through the notes and summarise the psychiatric history plus key facts, events, and 
interventions  
• Meet the staff who knew the service user best and ask them about the aspects that don’t appear 
in the notes: what they feel about the service user, and their hunches about the problem   
• Draw up a very tentative formulation 
• Convene a meeting for key staff, in order to share and get feedback on the formulation and 
collectively decide on the best way forward 
• Share the formulation with the service user as appropriate; follow up as needed (PW 4.3.2.) 
 
An example of this work is ‘Mary’, Vol 1 Part 1. Further examples can be seen in Vol 2`. The 
approach was felt to be very useful by the team, as evidenced by a steady stream of requests for 
team formulations, although I did not formally evaluate it. I subsequently used it with some 
success on an in-patient ward, from 2009 to 2010 (see handout of a ward teaching session, Vol 
2.) 
 
3.4.2 Trainee research projects on formulation 
 
One of the trainees who had helped me while on placement decided to carry out her research, 
under my supervision, in the area of using formulations in teams. She interviewed a number of 
local team-based psychologists with interesting results (Christofides, Johnstone and Musa, in 
press; Vol 2 and PW 4.3.3.) This first alerted me to the fact that there is a whole hidden body of 
work being carried out by psychologists and others in team settings, unacknowledged in the 
statistics, mostly unshared with the profession as a whole, and largely unresearched. This is 
surprising given that the psychologists in Christofides et al’s study described this work in such 
terms as ‘I think it’s one of the most powerful tools we have’; ‘It should be central to all the 
stuff we do, whether it be working individually, working systemically, working 
organisationally.’                            
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Another trainee subsequently did her doctoral research, also under my supervision, into a 
parallel exploration of the views of the non-psychologist MDT members who had experienced 
this kind of work in their teams (Hood and Johnstone, 2010, Vol 2 and PW 4.3.3.) The 
participants were universally enthusiastic, using such phrases as, ‘Formulation is really really 
useful and I think just to have the head space really to think about what was happening’. Indeed, 
they seemed to have a rather idealised view of formulation as a possible solution to the 
demoralising struggle with biomedical models and interventions in mental distress. In the words 
of one of them, ‘That is potentially where mental health has gone wrong because we try to 
manage things, we don’t try to resolve things, whereas if you went more towards formulations 
and therapy you would be looking at resolution. Not just treatment.’ Of course, these were 
small-scale studies of self-selected participants, but the results are consistent with other findings 
(see summary in ‘Using formulation in teams’ presentation, PW 4.3.2) and were enough to 
confirm my clinical experience of this as a highly effective and valued use of formulation.  
 
3.4.3 Workshops and training on team formulation 
 
In my experience, additional benefits arising from the use of formulation with teams, as opposed 
to with individuals, are: 
 
• Consistency of approach to intervention 
• Generating new ways of thinking 
• Dealing with core issues (not just crisis management) 
• Improved morale 
• Supporting each other with complex clients 
• Increasing team understanding and empathy 
• Meta-messages about hope and responsibility  
• Promoting more psychological thinking in teams 
 
In summary, formulating adds in the bit that routinely gets squeezed out in busy teams: 
providing a space for thinking, and for processing feelings. Formulation itself can be defined as 
a way of integrating thinking (our thoughts and theories about a service user) and feelings 
(theirs, and ours about them.) It can also serve as a process for integrating thinking and feeling 
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within teams. Workshop participants have almost all used comments like ‘excellent, 
inspiring,stimulating, brilliant, thought-provoking, challenging, extremely useful’ in their 
feedback (Vol 2.) 
 
Facilitating a team formulation meeting can be challenging. The facilitator needs to keep an eye 
on the large amount of information and the need to reduce it to a concise form, but also on the 
feelings and processes within the room, which often parallel the service user’s dilemmas. For 
example, the team may experience intense sadness, or frustration, or anger, as part of the 
discussion. ‘Splitting’ or Rescuing/Persecuting dynamics may also be present. All of this needs 
noticing and using as further information about the service user and the formulation. 
In parallel with this new area of interest, I have developed a workshop on the subject, which I 
was invited to present to a group of 40 local psychiatrists on 18.11.2009 (Vol 2.) I did so, 
tactfully and strategically omitting the anti-diagnosis angle and including a number of flattering 
references to the pioneering work of psychiatrists in this exciting field, and the response was 
very positive. I was immediately invited to give the presentation to several local teams, 
including a series of workshops to an inner city mental health assessment team (see handouts in 
PW 4.3.2, and feedback in Vol 2.) So far, every team has evaluated the workshop extremely 
positively and each event has led to requests for a repeat performance from other teams. I have 
now taken this roadshow to eight local teams with more engagements pending. I have also 
supported a number of our clinical psychologist graduates in devising teaching on formulation 
for their teams (see examples in Vol 2) and on 14.09.2010 gave a very well-received training 
day on ‘Using formulation in teams’ to 46 local psychologists (handout and feedback in Vol 2.)  
 
Using formulation in teams raises the tricky question of how far to disseminate the resulting 
document. A team formulation almost inevitably centres around the staff’s counter-transference; 
the powerful feelings of anger, frustration and pity that reflect service users’ own dilemmas. It 
has become clear to me that formulations are bound to take a slightly different form when the 
client is, in effect, the team (it is their struggles that are the presenting problem). In the same 
way that therapists would not share the entire content of supervision with a client, team 
formulations may also need to be kept within the team. However, good practice suggests that as 
far as is possible, a parallel formulation should also be developed with the service user (see 
example in Vol 2.) 
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As outlined above, I believe that the best formulation is always an integrative one, and nowhere 
is this more true than in work with highly complex service users who have long psychiatric 
histories. My experience of using formulation in teams has led me to believe that the following 
factors must always be included in an integrative team formulation: 
 
• Transference and counter-transference 
• A systemic perspective on the interaction between service user and the services as a whole 
• Social factors, including the identity of a ‘mental patient’ 
• Psychological framing of medical interventions such as medication, diagnosis and admission 
• The role of trauma and abuse 
 
(see PW 4.3.2) 
 
In my experience, clinical psychologists often omit the fourth factor from their formulations, as 
though matters like medication and admission are none of their professional business. On the 
contrary, these aspects of care need formulating like everything else. Medication, for example, 
can have all kinds of meanings, from ‘The doctors are trying to control me just as my parents 
did’ (see  Sarah, Vol 1 Part 1) to ‘I want to be cared for but I am too angry and fearful to accept 
it’ (see Mary, Vol 1 Part 1.) ‘Helpful’ responses like compliance may indicate a desire to hand 
over all responsibility to the team, while ‘uncooperative’ responses like refusing medication 
may represent a healthy desire to reject the patient role. 
 
The last factor, the role of trauma and abuse, is discussed under the next heading, ‘Promoting 
formulation for culture change.’ 
 
3.5 Promoting formulation for culture change (links to PW 4.4.1, 4.4.2.) 
 
3.5.1 Using team formulations to raise awareness of trauma and abuse 
 
It will be apparent from the previous section that using formulation in teams has benefits, and 
sometimes aims, beyond increasing the effectiveness of interventions with a series of 
challenging clients. It can also be a powerful way of changing team thinking. As a recent 
Division of Clinical Psychology document ‘Working psychologically in teams’ (DCP, 2007, p. 
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23) notes, ‘Taking formulation into a wider setting can be a powerful way of shifting cultures 
towards more psychosocial perspectives.’ 
 
One of the most urgently-needed shifts is towards acceptance of the major role of trauma and 
abuse in psychiatric breakdown (as discussed earlier.) I make these factors very explicit in my 
presentations (PW 4.3.2.) The slides on the shockingly high prevalence of trauma and abuse in 
‘psychosis’ always induce a stunned silence in my audiences. I tell them that the default 
formulation in any long-term case should always be trauma and abuse. A quote from Judith 
Herman’s classic book ‘Trauma and recovery’ (2001, pp.1-2) makes this point very powerfully:  
 
‘People who have survived atrocities often tell their stories in a highly emotional, contradictory, 
and fragmented manner which undermines their credibility and thereby serves the twin 
imperatives of truth-telling and secrecy…..Witnesses as well as victims are subject to the 
dialectic of trauma. It is difficult for an observer to remain clearheaded and calm, to see more 
than a few fragments of the picture at one time, to retain all the pieces, and to fit them together. 
It is even more difficult to find a language that conveys fully and persuasively what one has 
seen.’  
 
This quote vividly describes the pain, confusion and chaos that service users present to us. It is 
understandable, and yet not excusable, for professionals to try and avoid this pain and the 
horrific truths that lie behind the labels. In Scott’s words, ‘When the presenting “madness” is 
penetrated and the anguish and desperation is laid bare, it takes a strong stomach to continue 
with one’s endeavour’ (Scott and Seccombe, 1976, p.6). One way of beginning this task, and of 
starting to ‘fit all the pieces together’, is to construct a formulation. By doing this, of course, we 
enter the immensely painful position of witness to the atrocities. 
    
A more lighthearted way of making the same point is the ‘free gift’ that I include in my 
presentations to teams (PW 4.3.2):  
 
Lucy’s FREE one-size-fits-all formulation for long-term service users 
 
Service user X has unmet attachment needs and unresolved trauma from their early life. X tries 
to meet these through the psychiatric services, but fails, since services are not set up to do this. 
Still needy, but unable to achieve enough emotional security to move on, X ends up trading 
‘symptoms’ for whatever psychiatric care is on offer. Staff are initially sympathetic but become 
increasingly frustrated at X’s lack of progress. The resulting dynamic may end up repeating X’s 
early experiences of neglect, rejection or abuse. Both parties become stuck, frustrated and 
demoralised in this vicious circle. 
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Interestingly, no individual or team has ever disagreed with this analysis of the way  that 
services replicate people’s damaged early attachment relationships and in effect re-abuse them – 
and of course, the fault rarely lies at an individual level. It is a consequence of a mismatch 
between service user needs and the model we use to understand distress. By offering a 
formulation instead, ideally at first contact with the psychiatric services, there is a good chance 
that the whole destructive cycle can be interrupted, as follows:  
 
Service user X has unmet attachment needs and unresolved trauma from their early life. X tries 
to meet these through the psychiatric services……. 
 
                                    FORMULATE HERE!!!! 
 
The scene would then be set for offering the kind of help that the service user actually needed, 
whether that was therapy for the effects of abuse, social support, different housing, or whatever. 
Of course, a formulation does not guarantee an easy way forward or a happy final outcome. 
However, it does at least ensure that we are working collaboratively on appropriate responses to 
people’s actual problems.  
 
3.5.2 Formulation as an alternative to diagnosis 
 
Formulation is not just a vehicle for introducing awareness of trauma and abuse. Implicit in the 
one-size-fits-all formulation is the message that service users are best understood as ‘people 
with problems’ not ‘patients with illnesses.’ In other words, the biomedical model of mental 
distress is not only completely inappropriate; it actually compounds service users’ difficulties. 
(This was true of both Sarah and Mary, Vol 1 Part 1.) Again, this can be a tricky aspect of 
facilitating team formulation meetings. The staff in the room are rarely to blame as individuals; 
in fact, they tend to be a self-selected group of people who are willing to adopt new 
perspectives. At the same time, as team formulations accumulate, the uncomfortable message 
that we are all part of a system that creates rather than reduces distress is hard to ignore.  
 
As I have argued in several textbook chapters, formulation can be an antidote to the toxic effects 
of psychiatric diagnosis and everything that follows from that act. My table summarises this: 
 
          Diagnosis                                                     Formulation 
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          Removes meaning                                       Creates meaning 
          Removes agency (‘sick role’)                      Promotes agency 
          Removes social contexts                             Includes social contexts 
          Individualises                                              Includes relationships 
          Keeps relationships stuck                            Promotes relationship change   
          Expert-derived                                            Collaborative 
          Stigmatising                                                Non-stigmatising 
          Emphasis on pathology                               Includes strengths 
          Culture and value blind                               Culture and value aware 
          Medical consequences                                 No medical consequences  
          Social consequences                                    No social consequences 
 
(see PW 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.) 
 
In other words, formulation can put back what psychiatry takes out – it restores meaning and 
restores agency. It reminds us that we are not treating medical illnesses, which can be divided 
into neat parcels along the lines expected in medicine and the natural sciences, but working with 
human suffering, which manifestly cannot be categorised in this way.  
 
It is only to be expected that psychiatrists are reluctant to give up diagnosis, and prefer to see 
formulation as an addition to, not a replacement for, medical classification. However, it is 
disappointing that the profession of clinical psychology is deeply divided on this issue. While all 
clinical psychologists are familiar with formulation, many are reluctant to leave diagnosis 
behind. This was apparent when The Psychologist published a collection of scholarly articles 
arguing against the use of psychiatric diagnosis in May 2007. Responses to the supporting 
letters (of which mine was one) varied from moderate wishes ‘not to abandon a procedure which 
has served us well’ to the accusation that critics are ‘the new totalitarians’ who use ‘defensive 
rhetoric, ad hominem argument and sneer quotes’ to advance their case (‘Who criticises the 
critics?’Vol 3.).  
 
David Pilgrim, a senior member of the profession, has asked, ‘Do we not have a professional 
responsibility to challenge and expose the shortcomings of a diagnostic approach?…Surely our 
main duty is …not to shore up medical reifications’ (Pilgrim, 2000, p. 304.) It appears that the 
majority of clinical psychologists see it differently.  
 
3.5.3 Formulation as a radical act 
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There is a curious paradox in psychiatry, which I explored in a recent overview of ‘25 years of 
disagreeing with psychiatry’ (Johnstone, 2009): everything changes and nothing changes. The 
diagnoses, medications, management structures, types of intervention and so on are in a constant 
state of flux, but at the same time, this can be read as a desperate attempt to maintain the 
appearance of progress and to ward off despair in the face of the fact that nothing changes; the 
new icing on the cake conceals the same old biomedical model underneath, and the recovery 
rates are no better than before. The explanation I gave for this extraordinary state of affairs in 
‘Users and abusers of psychiatry’ is: ‘…..psychiatry is required to be the agent of society while 
purporting to be the agent of the individual; and its main function is not treatment but social 
control’ (2000, p. 219.) I further contended that ‘the principal mechanism by which psychiatry 
performs its function of social control is the use of the medical model….. which gives 
psychiatry powerful weapons for suppressing dissent (drugs, ECT) while enabling its true 
purpose to be concealed’ (2000, p. 223.) Many others have made the same point.  
 
The implications for the use of formulation are crucial. Introducing formulation as an alternative 
to the cornerstone of psychiatry, psychiatric diagnosis, is not simply a case of replacing poor 
practice with more effective methods. Giving service users back their voices, and ensuring that 
their stories are heard, is a fundamental challenge to the whole purpose of psychiatry and the 
vested interests therein. We can expect to meet resistance, as illustrated by the response from 
some clinical psychologists and by the example below. 
 
In 2009 Ross Hughes, an ex-service user who was employed as an advocate within my local 
Trust, started a campaign to have diagnosis replaced by formulation. He produced some eye-
catching posters (‘Help cure the terrifying mental health condition Delusional Diagnosing 
Disorder! Very, very silly labels damage lives!’) After various tactics such as threatening to hold 
a demonstration outside Trust headquarters, Ross and his co-workers were successful in getting 
a box marked ‘Formulation’ added to the CPA (Care Plan Approach) documents, but not in 
eliminating the compulsory ‘Diagnosis’ box. The medical director insisted that the word 
‘Biopsychosocial’ appeared before ‘Formulation’, thus allowing retention of essentially medical 
elements such as ‘Schizophrenia, triggered by stress.’ Ross also invited me to speak at a local 
conference titled ‘Beyond diagnosis’ (Vol 2.) Evidently I went too far beyond diagnosis, 
because the head of psychology (my former NHS manager) subsequently refused my offer to 
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provide formulation training for the Trust on the grounds that ‘it would give the wrong 
message.’ The ‘wrong’ message, I assume, was one that caused controversy by critiquing 
diagnosis. Without training, staff were unclear what to put in the ‘Formulation’ box, and it either 
remained blank or was simply used to record the diagnosis, as a service evaluation by one of our 
trainees found (Thomas, 2009.) Ross became disillusioned with his role, and moved on. New 
paperwork was introduced, and the ‘Formulation’ box disappeared. 
 
This gives a flavour of the resistance that can be anticipated. Nevertheless, I have continued to 
champion the use of formulation as an alternative to, not an addition to, diagnosis, in several 
book chapters (eg Johnstone, 2006a, Vol 2; Johnstone, 2008b ; Johnstone, in press b, 4.4.1; 
Johnstone, in press c.) I have also presented my views at a number of training events and 
conferences, including the inaugural conference of the Campaign to Abolish the Schizophrenia 
Label (www.asylumonline.net), where I was a keynote speaker (PW 4.4.2) and at a number of 
similar events (see Vol 2 for other examples of promoting formulation as an alternative to 
psychiatric diagnosis.) I wholeheartedly agree with CASL’s statement that ‘a single word can 
ruin a life as surely as any bullet, and schizophrenia is such a word’ (Hammersley and 
McLaughlin, 2007.) The same applies to every psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 Reflection on formulation: the wider picture, and future directions  
 
In this final section, I will summarise some of the reflections that have arisen from immersing 
myself in the theory and practice of formulation. 
 
3.6.1 Formulation: part of a long-standing tradition 
 
I have always maintained that there is nothing new under the sun in psychiatry or 
psychotherapy, and I have no wish to claim that formulation is an exception to this rule. Instead, 
I have come to see it as a contemporary rephrasing of an idea that has been part of the 
subjugated discourse in psychiatry since its inception, that madness has meaning. As such, it 
appears in slightly different forms in many other places. Although Freud did not use the term, 
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psychodynamic formulations are based on his ideas about the personal meaning of symbolic 
communications, defences, and the unconscious. Systemic therapists talk about a ‘working 
hypothesis’, which is simply a synonym for a formulation. The Hearing Voices Movement 
encourages voice-hearers to develop a construct about their voices, which is based on ‘at least 3 
different ways of formulating the link between the voices and someone’s life history: as a 
historical relationship, as a psychodynamic relationship, and as a metaphorical relationship’ 
(Romme and Escher, 2000, p.28.) Research into attachment theory shows that the outcome of 
damaging early relationships can most clearly be predicted from an adult’s ability to form a 
narrative about their childhood; if this can be done, their difficulties need not be passed on to 
their own children. Narrative therapy, as the name suggests, encourages clients to create 
alternative and more hopeful stories, or narratives, about their lives (Harper and Spellman, 
2006.) The Tidal Model of mental health nursing, which is a version of the Recovery Model, 
emphasises reclaiming the service user’s personal story of their distress (Barker and Buchanan-
Barker, 2006.) Looking further afield, some innovative approaches to psychosis in Finland are 
moving away from diagnosis and towards what might be called broad-level formulations, such 
as ‘identity crisis’ or ‘separation crisis’ in place of ‘schizophrenia’ (Alanen et al., 2000.) I 
believe that the theory and practice of formulation will be strengthened if we distance ourselves 
from claims about unique professional skills, and instead seek to build on the solid foundation 
created by many other clinicians and researchers.   
 
 
3.6.2 Formulation and its epistemological roots   
 
We should be aware that formulation remains firmly located within Western psychological 
theory. This epistemology is based on assumptions about individualism, selfhood, values, the 
role of spirituality and religion, mind-body relationships, family structures and the boundaries 
between ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality which are not givens in all cultures. Equally, other 
cultures may frame their explanations in mystical, metaphysical or paranormal terms that are 
alien to most Westerners. This raises various questions. At a theoretical level, do we simply 
regard personal or culturally-sanctioned explanations of this type as wrong?  If so, how does this 
fit with our commitment to respect service user perspectives?  And does it mean, essentially, 
that formulation as commonly understood can only be practised within a Western culture? At a 
pragmatic level, how do we work with someone whose explanations for their distress seem to us 
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manifestly ‘untrue’? Is  it possible to have a shared formulation in such cases, or do we privately 
retain our own version of the psychiatrists’ verdict of ‘lack of insight’ and regard them as 
mistaken? 
 
I do not have a full answer to these questions, but in reflecting on them it occurred to me that 
they arise within as well as between cultures. As we know, ‘psychotic’ service users frequently, 
in fact routinely, present us with explanations that clinicians do not believe to be true in a literal 
sense. For example, they may believe that devils have invaded their bodies. This does not 
prevent us from attempting to co-construct a formulation which assumes that such experiences 
are personally and symbolically meaningful even if not factually accurate. As always with 
formulation, we are looking for meanings not ‘facts’, whatever the service user’s cultural 
background. Of course we may need to inform ourselves about the cultural meanings of certain 
beliefs in order to do this effectively, and there may be quite a bit of ‘negotiating for shared 
meanings’ (Butler 1998) before we are able to develop a formulation that both parties can 
provisionally agree upon.  
 
Perhaps this also involves an appropriate degree of humility about our own constructs. I am 
currently working with a woman who believes that she has been taken over by evil spirits. I 
have suggested to her that a dissociative response to early sexual trauma may be a better 
explanation. At the same time, and I am aware how odd this may sound, I do not want to 
commit myself completely to the view that there are no such things as evil spirits. I am also 
open-minded about ghosts, reincarnation, life after death,  telepathy, psychic predictions and 
many other phenomena. If my extremely elementary understanding of modern physics is 
correct, there may yet be a way of accommodating such experiences within a scientific 
viewpoint. 
 
I think we can also reasonably assume that certain psychological processes and responses are 
common to all human beings; indeed the psychiatrist and anthropologist Roland Littlewood has 
suggested that themes of powerlessness, role strain, social rejection and so on underpin the more 
unusual cross-cultural manifestations of distress ( Lipsedge and Littlewood, 1997.)  Building on 
this kind of evidence may give us confidence that our Western formulations are well-grounded 
and not just applicable within Western psychology.  
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The Hearing Voices Network’s ‘construct’ takes an interesting perspective on these issues. . It is 
willing to step right outside conventional psychiatric and psychological explanations and 
acknowledge  entirely different frameworks that may be held by voice-hearers such as mystical, 
religious, metaphysical and paranormal beliefs. A conviction that voices are, for example, due to 
telepathy or reincarnation or gods or ghosts is treated with as much respect as any other belief 
system, and valued for its importance and usefulness to the voice-hearer.. Similarly, recent work 
on unusual beliefs suggests that it may be helpful to accept the reality of the person’s account 
and work with it (Knight 2007.) For example, carrying iron objects is said to ward off aliens, 
and may be reassuring to someone who is afraid of alien abduction. Ministers or shamans may 
be useful to people who report invasion by ghosts or spirits. Knight points out that ‘delusional’ 
beliefs are widespread in the ‘normal’ population, and as with hearing voices, do not need to be 
seen as problematic unless they are causing distress. In such cases it may not be possible to 
reach a shared formulation. At a pragmatic level, though, we can respect the person’s belief 
system and work with them to reduce distress.   
 
The strong self-help tradition of the Hearing Voices movement means that the creating of 
constructs is not seen as something that necessarily involves a professional; it can also be 
facilitated by a friend, partner or another voice-hearer. Within psychology, on the other hand, 
formulating is generally seen as an advanced skill that can only be carried out by professionals. . 
This brief consideration of epistemological issues reminds us that all of us can help to create 
meaning and offer ways of coping with distress; that our own culturally-sanctioned explanatory 
constructs are not necessarily more ‘true’ or more ‘useful’; and that we need to respect a variety 
of ways of understanding and coping with distress even if we do not fully share them.  
 
3.6.3 Formulation: limitations and traps 
 
As I have reflected on formulation throughout this doctoral process, it has become very apparent 
to me that it has limitations as well as strengths. Despite the list of ways in which formulation 
can be an antidote to diagnosis, nothing necessarily prevents it from being expert-driven, 
individualising, pathologising and so on, as discussed in Johnstone 2006d (PW 4.2.2.) I 
concluded that ‘Perhaps the best that can be said is that such tendencies are not intrinsic to the 
process of formulation…..whereas they are, arguably, an almost unavoidable consequence of 
psychiatric diagnosis’ (p. 224.)  
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We should also, in my view, beware of an emerging tradition within CBT formulation which 
sees it as ‘a central process in the role of the scientist-practitioner’ (Tarrier and Calam, 2002, 
p.311.) As such, it is argued that formulation should be open to assessment of reliability and 
validity. To this end a number of studies have been carried out, with the general conclusion that 
reliability of formulations is weak at best, while validity has hardly been addressed at all.  
 
It seems to me that this kind of approach rests on very questionable assumptions. For a start, it 
necessarily assumes that formulation is a kind of ‘event’ or ‘object’ rather than a process. From 
the latter perspective, formulation is an intrinsic part of a therapeutic encounter and has no clear 
start or end point, and indeed no clear guidelines as to what to include and what to leave out. A 
complete formulation would, presumably, take a lifetime to construct and could potentially 
include every thought, feeling and experience within that lifetime. Some of the clinical 
psychologists who were interviewed for trainee projects expressed this elegantly; one used the 
phrase ‘broad snapshot summaries of complex evolving stories’ (Cole and Johnstone, in press.)   
 
Secondly, this approach seems to rest on the positivist assumption that personal narratives or 
meanings can be described as either ‘true’ or ‘false’. This seems self-evidently nonsensical. 
Even if such a judgement were possible, who would make it? In fact this kind of research has 
largely ignored the service user perspective; assessments of validity and reliability have been 
based only on the clinicians’ views. In my opinion, it makes much more sense to acknowledge 
that ‘there is no one version of the truth because we largely construct our own realities, which 
inevitably leads to multiple perspectives on that reality’ (Messer, 1996, p.136), and that because 
of this, a formulation can only be assessed in terms of usefulness, not truth. Of course, 
‘usefulness’ also has to be defined (and Butler provides a list of criteria such as whether a 
formulation accounts for all the important factors, identifies risks and so on, Butler, 1998, p. 
21.) ‘Usefulness’ as a criterion also raises the question of ‘Useful to whom?’ These are 
important debates which raise questions of values and power, and cannot be answered within a 
positivist framework (see Johnstone, 2006d, PW 4.2.2.) 
 
3.6.4 Formulation and research 
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With all the caveats outlined above, it is an unavoidable fact that critics of psychiatry 
increasingly need to be able to ‘market’ and ‘sell’ their products in a highly sophisticated way. I 
have come to the conclusion that if we want to take forward formulation for culture change, 
using ‘formulation’ as a brand or marketing device which has some credibility, then in today’s 
evidence-based climate we need to show that it is effective – that it produces better outcomes, 
more satisfied ‘customers’, fewer admissions, reduced costs, and so on. So far, this evidence is 
lacking. This is particularly embarrassing for clinical psychologists, whose claim to be 
implementing evidence-based practice is undermined by the fact that their core skill, 
formulation, is itself unevidenced.  
 
I have summarised the existing research findings in my presentation ‘Research into formulation’ 
(given on 8.03.2010, see Vol 2.) In brief, there is little support for improved outcomes in therapy 
and mixed evidence about perceived helpfulness by clients (although formulation does seem to 
make the therapist feel better, Chadwick et al, 2003.) As above, reliability is moderate at best, 
while validity in formulations has hardly been defined, let alone assessed. Audits and qualitative 
research suggest that staff find team formulations very helpful (PW 4.3.2), although whether and 
how this translates into improved client outcomes is unknown.  
 
Researching the use of formulation in individual therapy presents numerous problems. How do 
you disentangle the formulation from the therapy, and what would it mean to carry out therapy 
without a formulation, or in other words, without a hypothesis about what is going on? This 
touches on the ‘formulation-as-event’ vs ‘formulation-as-process’ debate; the former may be 
easier to research, but the latter may be a better reflection of clinical reality.  
 
One way of separating formulation from therapy is to look at its use in teams. In such a case, the 
formulation can be separated out from the new intervention plan, which does not necessarily 
include therapy anyway. It would be relatively simple to compare a team formulation approach 
to service users with treatment-as-usual in a different team, and to take measures such as service 
user and staff satisfaction, length of treatment, number of admissions, and so on. I and a 
research colleague are hoping to be able to carry out such an evaluation in the near future.  
 
3.6.5 Formulation  - part of being human? 
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In Johnstone (2006d, p. 229, PW 4.2.2) I asked: ‘Is formulation a special skill?…The answer is 
both yes and no. We are all constantly engaged in a process of creating theories about the world 
and the people in it, and a great many non-professionals (as well as novelists, poets, 
philosophers, priests and others whose subject matter is human nature and human suffering) are 
extremely good at this.’ This, of course, is why formulation is so appealing to staff and service 
users; without necessarily being trained in formulating, they can instantly see its relevance and 
importance.  
 
On the other hand, I also know that creating shared understandings with highly distressed 
service users, doing so sensitively and reflectively, while drawing on a large basis of theory and 
clinical experience and framing it in a way that is useful to them and to the professionals who 
support them, is one of the most challenging aspects of my work. It is certainly not a skill that 
trainees acquire overnight. In this respect, formulation is worthy of at least some of the rather 
grandiose claims that have been made for it by members of the clinical psychology profession.  
 
I am continuing my formulation work as follows:  
 
• Preparing a 2nd edition of ‘Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy’, to include, 
among other aspects, a chapter on using formulation in teams.  
• Leading a working party to draw up Good Practice Guidelines on Psychological 
Formulation on behalf of the Division of Clinical Psychology. This will be a resource for 
clinical psychologists, trainees and training programmes, and is due to be launched at the 
December 2011 DCP Annual Conference. 
• Membership of a working party to draw up a Division of Clinical Psychology position 
statement on psychiatric diagnosis. This is an opportunity for the profession to develop a 
coherent position on the issues, and, I hope, be willing to promote formulation as an 
alternative to diagnosis. 
• Planning the first conference on ‘Using formulation in teams’to be held in October 2011 
under the auspices of the  Division of Clinical Psychology. Co-organisers and speakers will 
include several of the Bristol graduates who have taken the team formulation approach into 
their first jobs. 
• Delivering a training package to embed formulation into a major service re-design in the 
Adult Mental Health services in Sussex Partnership Trust. 
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• Continuing to promote formulation through clinical practice, training, writing and 
conference speaking. 
 
 
3.7  Final personal reflection 
 
The Registration Panel invited me to reflect on ‘the adversarial nature of…your current 
approaches to change.’  Such questions need to be posed with caution. There is a risk of 
implying that opposition and dissent are simply a matter of personal pathology. We would not 
ask Nelson Mandela to reflect on his antagonism towards apartheid, because we entirely accept 
that apartheid is wrong. I am in no way comparing myself to such a towering figure, but the 
principle is the same. From my perspective, biomedical psychiatry is every bit as reprehensible 
(and indeed it has some parallels with apartheid in that black and minority ethnic service users 
are treated particularly harshly.) In my experience, anger, frustration and disillusionment with 
biomedical psychiatry are almost universal among mental health professionals. The more 
relevant question then becomes, ‘Why do others accept the status quo?’ Some of the answers lie 
in lack of intellectual confidence and knowledge about the alternatives. Even if this doesn’t 
apply, anyone who takes a remotely dissenting position, however respectfully, is likely to find 
themselves in an ‘adversarial’ situation very quickly. Merely holding certain views is treated as 
a threat (‘Psychiatry: are we allowed to disagree?’ Johnstone, 1993a, Vol 3.) This is nothing to 
do with personal issues, and everything to do with a powerful system needing to defend itself.  
 
Having said that, there is of course a personal context to whatever positions we find ourselves 
in. From my family, I am indebted to my grandfather for permission, in Transactional Analysis 
terms, to think critically and act on my beliefs. As I have shown, clinical psychology as a 
platform for my values is the logical consequence of my personal experiences, and the perfect 
opportunity to use my abilities in teaching, training, writing, research, public speaking and 
clinical work. I wrote in 2006, ‘Questions about how we respond to human suffering are not 
simply ones of science or evidence, though that may be a part of it. They are ultimately moral, 
ethical and political issues on which we all need to take a stand’ (Johnstone 2006a, p 98; Vol 2.) 
This doctoral thesis has been an opportunity for me to reflect on my stand and the reasons 
behind it. It has also served as a way of processing some of the more difficult events of recent 
years. 
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In relation to the request to ‘say more about your strategy as a change agent’, I have described 
how this has developed from naïve confrontation in my first post, to a far more sophisticated 
multi-level engagement with psychiatric theory and practice as taught to trainees on the Bristol 
Doctorate. Although the early years of my career were characterised by fights with the system, 
for the last 10 years I have been mainly engaged in promoting positive alternatives – training 
others, and of course developing formulation as a tool for radical change. 
 
This brings me onto the question of impact, and how much change I have achieved, either on my 
own or in conjunction with like-minded allies. The bigger answer is clear: very little. Despite 
constant reincarnations, the juggernaut of biomedical psychiatry rolls on in much the same way 
(see 3.5.3.) It serves important political and business interests, and would-be reformers only 
have limited room for manouevre within this wider picture (Warner, 2004.) Nevertheless, 
history tells us that even the most oppressive regime cannot ultimately withstand a grassroots 
movement. If real change comes from anywhere, I believe it will be from the growing strength 
of the service user/survivor movement, of which I am proud to be a supporter.  
 
Within the contextual limitations described above, I am fortunate enough to have had the 
opportunity to influence others, including the 200 graduates from the Bristol Doctorate, through 
the various stages of my career and many of these people have taken the critical perspective 
forward into their own settings. As I used to tell trainees, you never know what seeds you are 
sowing by your words and actions (see ‘Additional evidence of impact’ Vol 3 for some 
examples.) Equally importantly, I have had the enormous privilege of helping at least some 
service users to leave psychiatry behind. As I also used to tell trainees, a single one of these 
lives saved justifies an entire career.  
 
The world of mental health is currently being swept by a wave of  Mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 
2004.) Despite my instinctive cynicism about some of the ways it is being packaged, I have 
personally found it helpful to try very hard to adopt an attitude of ‘doing what is right’ without 
aim or ego. What follows from that, will follow; and the things that change must be accepted 
along with those that do not change. Mindfulness doesn’t prevent conflict, but it provides a 
vantage point above the battlefield, so to speak, which offers some protection against burn-out 
and despair. It has been particularly painful coming to terms with the loss of the course I loved, 
and with what feels like exile to my current clinical post in a highly medicalised service in South 
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Wales  - not unlike my first post nearly 30 years ago. It is not how I envisaged my future. I am 
working towards accepting this too.   
 
3.7.1 Final final personal reflection 
 
In my work I describe formulation as a framework for integrating thinking and feeling. I also 
emphasise that formulation is centrally about personal meaning. The core assumption of a 
formulation is that ‘at some level, it all makes sense.’ Formulation should also form a bridge 
between professional and service user, a way of creating an agreed way forward together.  
 
This context statement can perhaps be understood as a way of integrating my own thinking and 
feeling, my own theory and practice, and the bridge between the professional part of me and the 
part that identifies with service user experience. It illustrates the personal meaning behind my 
own journey, and the plans (or in formulation terms, interventions) that I may develop for the 
future. 
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